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ABSTRACT 
In United States v. Caronia, the Second Circuit recently 
concluded that the Food and Drug Administration’s prohibition 
against off-label pharmaceutical marketing violates the First 
Amendment’s limited protection for commercial speech, contrary to 
long-standing FDA policy. In Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. United States 
Food & Drug Administration, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York followed the Caronia court’s holding. 
It granted a preliminary injunction to a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer, preventing the FDA from enforcing its prohibition and 
allowing the manufacturer to market drugs off-label using truthful 
and non-misleading speech. These judicial decisions represent a 
significant departure from previous norms in the pharmaceutical 
industry, where the FDA strictly prohibited and patrolled off-label 
marketing.
The decisions in Caronia and Amarin arose out of an incorrect 
application of the Supreme Court’s Central Hudson analysis for 
determining whether a government regulation violates First 
Amendment protection for commercial speech. The two courts failed 
to give the government the amount of deference owed to commercial 
speech regulation, even though the government has a substantial 
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interest in ensuring that drugs are safe and effective for human use. 
The courts should have found that the FDA’s prohibition does not 
violate the First Amendment. 
Regardless of the constitutionality of the FDA’s prohibition, 
the policy creates a practical problem. The prohibition prevents 
useful, beneficial information from circulating freely between 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and physicians, even while it prevents 
misleading information from causing harm. Because pharmaceutical 
sales representatives are not permitted to market off-label, 
physicians have less access to information about new off-label uses 
that may be lifesaving to patients. To solve this problem, the FDA 
should amend its policy to allow pharmaceutical companies to 
disseminate factual, unbiased information obtained from clinical 
trials to physicians once the company has submitted a supplemental 
new drug application to the FDA for approval of a particular off-
label use. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Caronia1 
that the United States violated the First Amendment when it 
construed the misbranding provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA)2 to prohibit off-label3 marketing by 
pharmaceutical sales representatives and prosecuted a sales 
                                                 
 1. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 2. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2012). The misbranding provision 
of the FDCA states, “The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited: (a) 
The introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, 
drug, device, tobacco product, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.” Id. 
§ 331(a) (2015).
 3. According to the FDA, “off-label” refers to using a drug in a way that is 
different from that described in the FDA-approved drug label. Understanding 
Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off Label”, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
forpatients/other/offlabel/default.htm [https://perma.cc/54W5-87P6] (last updated 
June 2, 2016). The drug label of FDA-approved drugs gives information about the 
drug, including the approved doses and how it is to be given to treat the medical 
condition for which it was approved. Id. Moreover, when a drug is used off-label, 
this can mean that the drug is “[u]sed for a disease or medical condition that it is not 
approved to treat”; “[g]iven in a different way” (such as by a different route); or 
“[g]iven in a different dose.” Id.
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representative based on that construction.4 This holding conflicts 
with established Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations 
and policy.5 On August 7, 2015, in Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. United 
States Food & Drug Administration, the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York applied Caronia to a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer’s action against the FDA.6 In that case, 
Amarin Pharma, Inc. alleged that the FDA would violate Amarin’s 
First Amendment rights if the FDA enforced misbranding 
regulations against it as threatened for making truthful and non-
misleading statements about an unapproved use of one of Amarin’s 
FDA-approved drugs.7 The court clarified the Second Circuit’s 
Caronia holding, explaining that not only could the FDA not 
prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives 
directly for truthful and non-misleading speech about off-label uses, 
but that the FDA also could not use truthful and non-misleading 
speech by manufacturers as evidence of intent to promote the sale of 
misbranded drugs in interstate commerce.8 The court granted Amarin 
a preliminary injunction to prevent the FDA from prosecuting, based 
on the likelihood of Amarin’s success on the merits of its First 
Amendment claim.9 
Through Caronia, the Second Circuit implicitly endorsed a 
novel route for pharmaceutical companies to assert and defend their 
alleged right to truthfully market drugs for off-label uses by holding 
that the misbranding provision could not be used to prevent 
marketing protected by the First Amendment.10 It thereby frustrated 
the FDA’s policy against dissemination of promotional speech about 
unapproved uses of drugs and “call[ed] into question the very 
                                                 
 4. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 169 (“We conclude simply that the government 
cannot prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives under the 
FDCA for speech promoting the lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved drug.”). 
 5. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 99 (1998) and its subparts, which regulate 
“Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed Drugs, 
Biologics, and Devices.” 
 6. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 
196, 223-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 7. Id. at 198, 219. 
 8. Id. at 227-28. 
 9. Id. at 237. 
 10. See id. at 208 (“The Second Circuit’s 2012 decision in Caronia 
addressed, for the first time, the interplay between the FDCA’s misbranding 
provisions and the First Amendment.”). 
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foundations of our century-old system of drug regulation.”11 
According to the FDA, the prohibition against off-label marketing 
ensures that pharmaceutical manufacturers will follow the existing 
regulatory scheme to obtain approval for subsequent drug uses after 
initial approval.12 The regulatory drug approval process is intended to 
protect the public from unsafe and ineffective drugs.13  
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the FDA’s ban 
on off-label promotion violates the First Amendment,14 but others 
have criticized the ban as an unconstitutional prohibition on 
commercial speech.15 The Caronia and Amarin courts agreed with 
that criticism, and the Amarin court noted additionally that the 
commercial-speech doctrine and First Amendment jurisprudence 
have outmoded the FDA regulatory scheme of the 1960s.16 In 1980, 
the Supreme Court created a four-factor test in Central Hudson Gas 
v. Public Service Commission of New York to determine whether any 
particular government action violates First Amendment protection of 
commercial speech.17 Applying this test, the Caronia court held that 
the FDA’s ban on off-label marketing violated the First Amendment 
because the ban also prohibited truthful and non-misleading speech.18  
                                                 
 11. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (Livingston, 
J., dissenting).  
 12. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 226 (“[T]he FDA argues that . . . protecting 
truthful speech aimed at promoting off-label drug use is ‘a frontal assault . . . on the 
framework for new drug approval that Congress created in 1962,’ . . . because 
allowing a manufacturer to promote such use ‘has [] the potential to eviscerate [the] 
FDA drug approval regime.’” (quoting Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (No. 15 
Civ. 3588), 2015 WL 4387279, at *1)).  
 13. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (“An Act 
[t]o protect the public health by amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act to assure the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs, authorize 
standardization of drug names, and clarify and strengthen existing inspection 
authority . . . .”). 
 14. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (Nos. 09-5006-cr 
(L), 10-750-cr (CON)), 2010 WL 6351495, at *34-35 (“The issue of non-fraudulent 
commercial free speech within the drug and device industry has narrowly avoided 
judicial review until now.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription 
Advertising, the FDA and the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of 
Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315 (2011). 
 16. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 152; see also Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 226-27.  
 17. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). For an in-depth analysis of the Central Hudson test, see infra Section II.B. 
 18. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 164-69. 
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The Caronia court misapplied Central Hudson, however, and 
the ban on off-label promotion is necessary to prevent false and 
misleading information about off-label uses from becoming 
pervasive and seriously injuring the public.19 The ban on off-label 
promotion is constitutional under the Central Hudson test because 
(1) the Caronia court examined whether off-label promotion was 
inherently false and misleading rather than examining whether off-
label promotion was more than likely to be false and misleading;20 
(2) the speech likely relates to unlawful activity because under the 
FDCA, pharmaceutical manufacturers may not introduce or cause to 
be introduced into interstate commerce any drug that is misbranded, 
i.e., lacking adequate instructions for its intended use;21 and (3) the 
ban is necessary and narrowly tailored to promote the government’s 
substantial interest in protecting public health and safety as well as 
the integrity of the FDA drug approval process.22  
If the FDA’s prohibition on off-label promotion of drugs is 
constitutional, then a conflict remains between the FDA’s goal—
ensuring that pharmaceuticals are safe and effective23—and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ objectives—to promote and sell 
drugs.24 Many scholars have criticized the slow, expensive FDA drug 
approval process as being outpaced by rapid advancements taking 
place in pharmaceutical development and by physicians’ and 
patients’ needs for new, experimental drugs.25 The solution to this 
                                                 
 19. See Kate Greenwood, The Ban on “Off-Label” Pharmaceutical 
Promotion: Constitutionally Permissible Prophylaxis Against False or Misleading 
Commercial Speech?, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 278 (2011), for an analysis of the 
constitutionality of the FDA’s off-label promotion ban. 
 20. See infra Subsection IV.A.1. 
 21. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2015); id. § 352(f) (2013). 
 22. See infra Subsections IV.A.3-4. 
 23. See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (2011); see also Stephanie M. Greene, Opening 
Statement: FDA Prohibitions on Off-Label Marketing Do Not Violate Drug 
Manufacturers’ First Amendment Rights, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 239, 246 
(2014), https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-239.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/RNQ3-WLRR]. 
 24. Id. at 241 (describing “the practice of sales representatives visiting 
doctors in their offices to promote drugs,” and the likelihood that those 
representatives will be motivated by sales and profits). 
 25. See, e.g., Dale H. Gieringer, The Safety and Efficacy of New Drug 
Approval, 5 CATO J. 177, 178 (1985) (“The bureaucracy at the FDA acquired a 
reputation for remarkable inefficiency and delay . . . [and] the time and expense of 
new drug development increased dramatically.”); see also John E. Osborn, Can I 
Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective on Regulating Off-Label Scientific 
and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 299, 305 (2010) 
(“Indeed, some have said that off-label prescribing should be encouraged to advance 
 Defending the Ban on Off-Label Marketing 1415 
problem is rooted in physicians’ need for reliable scientific 
information about off-label uses26 that comes from rigorous clinical 
testing.27 In the current regulatory scheme, the FDA recommends that 
pharmaceutical sales representatives only distribute “scientific and 
medical publications on unapproved uses,” meaning articles from 
peer-reviewed scientific and medical journals or reference texts,28 
                                                                                                       
public health in the face of a moribund agency approval process that is underfunded, 
overwhelmed, and incapable of timely reviewing and approving new indications at a 
pace consistent with medical developments.”); Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and 
Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate Levels of Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, 
AIDS, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B.U. L. REV. 93, 100 (1999) (“[T]he path of a 
new drug from the moment of conceptualization to its ultimate marketing has been 
laborious and time-consuming. Many critics suggest that the existing drug approval 
system entails an excessive number of trials and observations per trial, delaying both 
the development of new drugs and the optimization of effective dosing.”). 
 26. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 
196, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 27. Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for 
Heightened Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 
476 (2009). Dresser and Frader explained physicians’ need for conclusive clinical 
trials for off-label indications as follows: 
Off-label prescribing can also harm patients, however. The 
potential for harm is greatest when an off-label use lacks a solid 
evidentiary basis. A 2006 study examining prescribing practices for 169 
commonly prescribed drugs found high rates of off-label use with little or 
no scientific support. Researchers examining off-label use in U.S. 
children’s hospitals concluded, “[W]e still have incomplete knowledge 
about the safety and efficacy of many medications commonly used to treat 
children across a range of drug classes and clinical diagnoses.” More than 
half the respondents in a survey of academic medical centers reported that 
innovative off-label prescribing raised concerns in their institutions, such 
as lack of data . . . . 
. . . 
In a perfect world, all uses of drugs and devices would be 
supported by solid research. 
Id.
 28. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 
DISTRIBUTING SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW 
USES—RECOMMENDED PRACTICES 1 (2014), http://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-
public/@fdagov-drugs-gen/documents/document/ucm387652.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2J8-
GDBX] (“This guidance describes the Food and Drug Administration’s . . . current 
thinking on recommended practices for drug and medical device manufacturers and 
their representatives to follow when distributing to health care professionals or 
health care entities scientific or medical journal articles, scientific or medical 
reference texts, or clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) that discuss unapproved new 
uses for approved drugs . . . marketed in the United States. For the purpose of this 
guidance, these materials are generally referred to as scientific and medical 
publications.”). 
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because the FDA will not use dissemination of those texts as 
evidence of the manufacturer’s intent to misbrand drugs.29 In support 
of its current policy, the FDA explicitly recognizes the importance of 
communicating truthful, non-misleading information to medical 
professionals.30 Yet the FDA persists in its position that it cannot 
guarantee public health and safety without adherence to the full 
rigors of the new drug approval process.31  
To accommodate the competing interests in play—including 
the FDA’s interest in drug safety and efficacy, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers’ interest in marketing and selling drugs for new uses, 
and medical professionals’ interest in providing the best health care 
to patients—the FDA should allow pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
make certain factual statements about off-label uses of the drugs they 
develop based on the results of clinical trials.32 A pharmaceutical 
company should only be given this information–facilitation role, 
however, after it submits a supplemental new drug application for the 
off-label use.33 This would solve the off-label promotion problem in 
several ways: (1) pharmaceutical representatives would become 
disseminators of sound research on off-label uses and (2) the FDA 
would ensure that the information physicians receive is up-to-date, 
scientifically researched, tested, and proven, if not necessarily 
conclusive.34 
Part I of this Note discusses the legal history of the FDA’s 
regulation of pharmaceutical promotion and focuses on off-label 
marketing. Part I also analyzes policy arguments from the 
perspectives of the FDA and pharmaceutical companies. Part II 
covers the early history of judicial views on commercial speech and 
                                                 
 29. See id. at 6 (“Consistent with longstanding FDA policy and practice, if 
manufacturers distribute scientific or medical publications as recommended in this 
guidance, FDA does not intend to use such distribution as evidence of the 
manufacturer’s intent that the product be used for an unapproved new use.”). 
 30. See id. (“[T]he public health may benefit when health care professionals 
receive truthful and non-misleading scientific or medical publications on 
unapproved new uses. This information can be particularly important given that a 
health care professional can generally choose to use or prescribe an approved or 
cleared medical product for an unapproved use, if the off-label use is appropriate 
based on his or her judgment.”). 
 31. See id. (“The narrow ‘safe harbor’ recommended in the guidance was 
also consistent with FDA’s continued belief that FDA premarket review and 
approval are critical to public health.”). 
 32. See infra Section IV.B. 
 33. See infra Section IV.B. 
 34. See infra Section IV.B. 
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includes decisions concerning the interaction of commercial speech 
with the First Amendment. Part III considers two modern court 
decisions on off-label marketing regulations. Part IV argues that the 
best solution to the conflict between competing policies is to allow 
certain restricted commercial speech about off-label uses by 
pharmaceutical representatives, rather than to entirely prohibit it, in 
order to ensure that available information about off-label uses is as 
true and non-misleading as possible, given the advancement of 
medical knowledge at any time. 
I. REGULATORY HISTORY AND POLICY SURROUNDING OFF-LABEL 
MARKETING 
Congress enacted the FDCA in 193835 in response to the wide 
availability of unsafe, mislabeled, and adulterated pharmaceuticals 
for sale in the United States.36 The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 
1906,37 the predecessor of the FDCA and creator of the FDA,38 was 
still in effect when Senator Royal S. Copeland of New York 
introduced the FDCA as Senate Bill 1944 (S. 1944) in 1933.39 
Scholars and the FDA had long criticized the 1906 Act for providing 
insufficient protection to the public from unsafe drugs.40 At the 
                                                 
 35. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 
Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2012)). 
 36. See Henry A. Waxman, A History of Adverse Drug Experiences: 
Congress Had Ample Evidence to Support Restrictions on the Promotion of 
Prescription Drugs, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 299, 300 (2003). 
 37. See Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768. 
38. See When and Why Was the FDA Formed?, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm214403.htm [https://perma.cc/3M8M-ZSX6] (last 
updated Mar. 4, 2016). 
 39. See S. 1944, 73d Cong. § 26(a) (1933) (“This Act shall take effect six 
months after the date of approval. The Federal Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 
1906, as amended, (U.S.C., title 21, secs. 1-15) shall remain in force until such 
effective date, and is hereby repealed effective upon such date . . . .”); see also 
David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History 
and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 2, 8 (1939). 
 40. See Cavers, supra note 39, at 5-6; see also Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: 
Hearings on S. 1944 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong. 58-
59 (1933) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Walter G. Campbell, Chief, Food and 
Drug Administration). In 1932, scholars Arthur Kallet and F.J. Schlink wrote and 
published 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs: Dangers in Everyday Foods, Drugs, and 
Cosmetics, which criticized the American pharmaceutical and food industries in the 
United States for selling products to consumers without knowing how those 
products would affect consumers. See ARTHUR KALLET & F.J. SCHLINK, 100,000,000 
GUINEA PIGS: DANGERS IN EVERYDAY FOODS, DRUGS, AND COSMETICS 251 (1932) 
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introduction of S. 1944 at a Senate subcommittee hearing, Hon. 
Henry A. Wallace, the then-Secretary of Agriculture,41 advocated for 
the bill and listed improvements it made on the existing legislative 
scheme, including prohibiting “[f]alse advertising of foods, drugs, 
and cosmetics,” requiring “[d]efinitely informative labeling,” and 
providing “[m]ore effective methods for the control of false labeling 
and advertising of drug products.”42 Walter G. Campbell, then-chief 
of the FDA, spoke at length on new provisions of the bill at the 
subcommittee hearing, including one provision that required 
informative labeling to distinguish cures from palliative products.43 
As introduced, the bill had two overarching goals: (1) “[t]o prevent 
the manufacture, shipment, and sale of adulterated or misbranded 
food, drugs, and cosmetics, and to regulate traffic therein” and 
(2) “to prevent the false advertisement of food, drugs, and 
cosmetics.”44 The purpose of the bill was to ensure that consumers 
received accurate information about the drugs they purchased and to 
protect them from harmful products.45  
                                                                                                       
(attributing death, disease, and economic loss to “the indifference and the avarice of 
the manufacturers of food and drugs”). The book also criticized the existing federal 
legislation that regulated the industry. See Hazel Kyrk, Book Reviews: 100,000,000 
Guinea Pigs—Dangers in Everyday Foods, Drugs, and Cosmetics, 6 J. BUS. U. CHI. 
352, 352 (1993).  
 41. Originally, the Department of Agriculture housed the FDA. FDA’s 
Origin, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm124403. 
htm [https://perma.cc/G7FE-F7HB] (last updated June, 23, 2014). It was not until 
1980 that the FDA transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services, its 
current location. Id.
 42. Hearing, supra note 40, at 12 (statement of Hon. Henry A. Wallace, 
Secretary of Agriculture). 
 43. Id. at 41 (statement of Walter G. Campbell, Chief, Food and Drug 
Administration) (“[Consumers] should not be sold a remedy labeled as a cure for 
that disease unless it is a cure for that disease. [Consumers] have the right to buy it 
intelligently. [Consumers] should have the right to buy it with full knowledge of the 
fact that it will not operate as a cure if it is merely palliative. This particular 
paragraph [of the bill] proposes such a requirement.”). 
 44. S. 1944, supra note 39.  
 45. Hearing, supra note 40, at 12 (statement of Hon. Henry A. Wallace, 
Secretary of Agriculture) (“I think it is generally understood that this bill is intended 
primarily to protect consumers. At the same time it should operate in the interest of 
all honest manufacturers.”). 
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A. Historical Reasons for Enactment of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act 
In large part, criticism of the 1906 Act stemmed from tragedies 
that occurred because consumers ingested and were harmed by 
unsafe, mislabeled, or adulterated drugs, and existing legislation was 
ineffective in preventing or punishing manufacturers that sold those 
drugs.46 For example, while speaking in support of S. 1944 and new 
restrictions on pharmaceutical companies, one scholar warned that 
taking “dinitrobenzol,” a chemical advertised as a weight-loss 
remedy, could cause a person’s temperature to rise by nine or ten 
degrees and that “[w]ithin 24 hours that patient has practically 
burned himself to death.”47 The 1906 Act did nothing to protect 
against that risk because it did not regulate drug safety.48 
Despite strong support for the bill from the FDA in 1933, the 
FDCA was not enacted until five years after its introduction, in 
1938.49 The drug industry, in particular, forcefully resisted its 
enactment.50 The bill failed to gain the required votes in the 73rd and 
74th Congresses, but Senator Copeland introduced a new version 
each time it was defeated.51 The “Sulfanilamide Disaster” was the 
impetus that finally caused Congress to enact the FDCA.52 In late 
                                                 
 46. See, e.g., id. at 11 (“I doubt that anyone will wish to appear before this 
committee in defense of the many abuses which cannot be remedied under existing 
legislation; there is too much grim evidence of the tragic effects that almost daily 
result from the Government’s inability to prevent the shipment and sale of 
dangerous and worthless products.”); see also id. at 46-47 (statement of Yandell 
Henderson, Professor of Applied Physiology, Yale University) (“I know of cases in 
which illness, or even death, has occurred from inadequate protection because of the 
inadequacy of the present law.”). 
 47. Id. at 47 (statement of Yandell Henderson, Professor of Applied 
Physiology, Yale University). According to the National Center for Biotechnology 
Information, dinitrobenzenes “are synthetic substances that are used in explosives.” 
PubChem Open Chemistry Database, Compound Summary for CID 7452, NAT’L 
CTR. BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., http://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/1_3-
Dinitrobenzene#section=Safety-and-Hazards (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). Under the 
Globally Harmonized System (GHS) for Hazard Communication, the chemical is 
classified as toxic, hazardous to health, and environmentally damaging. Id. § 10.1.1 
(under “Hazards Identification: GHS Classification” heading). 
 48. Hearing, supra note 40, at 47 (statement of Yandell Henderson, 
Professor of Applied Physiology, Yale University).
 49. Cavers, supra note 39, at 2.  
 50. Id. at 8-9. 
 51. Id. at 8-18. 
 52. Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir 
Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE (June 1981), http://www.fda. 
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1937, more than one hundred people died after taking Elixir 
Sulfanilamide, a solution of the antibiotic sulfanilamide dissolved in 
a toxic solvent called diethylene glycol.53 Although the manufacturer 
tested Elixir Sulfanilamide to ensure that it met consumer 
preferences such as fragrance, taste, and appearance, the company 
did not test for toxicity because existing law did not require toxicity 
testing.54 This tragedy provided the momentum needed for both the 
House and Senate to pass the FDCA, and President Roosevelt signed 
it into law on June 25, 1938.55  
While the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 spanned only five 
pages in the United States Statutes at Large,56 the FDCA spanned 
twenty pages.57 Two notable additions formed parts of the bulkier, 
more comprehensive act: (1) the definition of “new drug”58 and 
(2) the requirement that all new drugs have an approved application 
on file with the FDA before being introduced into interstate 
commerce.59 Although these provisions were a vast improvement on 
                                                                                                       
gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/productregulation/sulfanilamidedisaster/default.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JP5H-9KE7]; see also Cavers, supra note 39, at 20; Jef Akst, The 
Elixir Tragedy, 1937, SCIENTIST (June 1, 2013), http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles. 
view/articleNo/35714/title/The-Elixir-Tragedy--1937/ [https://perma.cc/STX4-6U39];
Dennis B. Worthen, Pharmaceutical Legislation: An Historical Perspective, 10 
INT’L J. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPOUNDING 20, 24-25 (2006), http://www.lloydlibrary. 
org/scholar/Legislation%20final%20pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/S944-HVR8]. 
 53. See Ballentine, supra note 52; see also Cavers, supra note 39, at 20. 
 54. See Ballentine, supra note 52; see also Cavers, supra note 39, at 20. 
 55. See Cavers, supra note 39, at 20-22.  
 56. See Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768. 
 57. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 
Stat. 1040.  
 58. Id. § 201(p) (“The term ‘new drug’ means—[a]ny drug the composition 
of which is such that such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified 
by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety of drugs, as safe for use 
under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof 
. . . .”). 
 59. Worthen, supra note 52, at 25; see also Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505(a), (d), 52 Stat. 1040, 1052: 
(a) No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate 
commerce any new drug, unless an application filed . . . is effective 
with respect to such drug.  
. . . 
(d) If the Secretary finds, after due notice to the applicant and giving 
him an opportunity for a hearing, that (1) the investigations . . . do not 
include adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show 
whether or not such drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof; (2) the 
results of such tests show that such drug is unsafe for use under such 
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the 1906 Act, the 1938 FDCA regulated only drug safety but not 
drug efficacy.60 In the 1950s and 1960s, Congress again held 
hearings on food, drug, and cosmetics issues, which revealed that 
pharmaceutical companies were marketing their products with false 
and misleading promotional materials and that consumers and 
physicians relied on that information to the detriment of public 
health and well-being.61 In 1962, both houses of Congress voted 
unanimously to pass the Kefauver–Harris Amendments to the 
FDCA,62 which added drug efficacy as one of the FDA’s regulatory 
objectives.63 Today, the FDCA requires pharmaceutical companies to 
test all new drugs for safety and efficacy before the FDA will 
approve a new drug application.64 If a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
sells a drug that is not approved by the FDA or not labeled properly, 
then that sale violates the FDCA.65  
                                                                                                       
conditions or do not show that such drug is safe for use under such 
conditions; (3) the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used 
for, the manufacture, processing, and packing of such drug are 
inadequate to preserve its identity, strength, quality, and purity; or (4) 
upon the basis of the information submitted to him as part of the 
application . . . he has insufficient information to determine whether 
such drug is safe for use under such conditions, he shall . . . issue an 
order refusing to permit the application to become effective.  
 60. See Waxman, supra note 36, at 300. 
 61. Id. at 301-02 (“A large part of these hearings focused on the false and 
misleading promotion of drugs by the pharmaceutical industry. The evidence 
developed from these hearings demonstrated that a regulatory scheme that depended 
on postmarket enforcement against false and misleading promotion was grossly 
inadequate to protect Americans from serious harm. The hearings showed that the 
pharmaceutical marketplace was filled with misleading promotional material on 
which physicians relied, that there was no reliable source of evidence from which 
physicians could tell effective drugs from ineffective drugs, and that many 
Americans were being subjected unnecessarily to toxic drugs whose benefits had 
been greatly exaggerated or were nonexistent.”).
62. See Kefauver-Harris Amendments Revolutionized Drug Development, 
FDA CONSUMER HEALTH INFO. 1-2 (Oct. 2012), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ 
ConsumerUpdates/ucm322856.htm [https://perma.cc/XQT8-R66G]. 
 63. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(a)(1), 76 
Stat. 780, 781 (“Section 201(p)(1) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act . . . 
defining the term ‘new drug’, is amended by (A) inserting therein, immediately after 
the words ‘to evaluate the safety’, the words ‘and effectiveness’, and (B) inserting 
therein, immediately after the words ‘as safe’, the words ‘and effective.’”). 
 64. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012). 
 65. See id. § 331. 
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B. Food and Drug Administration’s Prohibition Against Off-Label 
Marketing 
The FDCA prohibits drug misbranding through several 
provisions.66 It is the FDA’s policy that in combination with the 
definitions of “misbranded” and “labeling,” the misbranding 
provisions prohibit off-label marketing of pharmaceuticals.67 The 
United States and the FDA cite § 331(a) in particular as the basis for 
prosecution of pharmaceutical sales representatives who have 
discussed off-label uses of an FDA-approved drug with prescribing 
physicians.68 Section 331(a) prohibits causing the introduction of a 
misbranded drug into interstate commerce.69 Under the FDCA, a 
drug is misbranded “[u]nless its labeling bears adequate directions 
for use” and “adequate warnings against use in those pathological 
conditions or by children where its use may be dangerous to health, 
or against unsafe dosage or methods or duration of administration . . . 
as are necessary for the protection of users.”70 Off-label uses of FDA-
approved drugs are considered “new drugs” under the FDCA 
because off-label uses have not been tested for safety and 
                                                 
 66. See id. § 331(a)-(c), (g), (k). 
 67. See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 28, at 3. The FDA advised, 
“[T]he modern Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act . . . and FDA regulations 
prohibit manufacturers from introducing new drugs . . . into interstate commerce for 
any intended use that FDA has not determined to be safe and effective.” Id. It also 
cited specific sections supporting its position and the policy underlying it:  
The requirement that safety and effectiveness for each intended use be 
established before introduction of the product into interstate commerce 
for that use came from experience showing that exclusive reliance on 
post-hoc remedies, such as enforcement actions for false or misleading 
labeling, was inadequate to protect the public health, as these remedies 
were not sufficient to deter manufacturers and distributors—who profit 
from sales of their products for any use—from making unsubstantiated 
and misleading claims to encourage use of their products.  
Id. at 3 n.9. 
 68. See Brief for United States, United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (Nos. 09-5006-cr(L), 10-0750(CON)), 2010 WL 6351497, at *32; see 
also Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 203 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[T]he FDA’s position is that a manufacturer who markets or 
promotes an off-label drug risks criminal liability for ‘misbranding’ under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 331(a) . . . .”). 
 69. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012) (“The following acts and the causing 
thereof are hereby prohibited: (a) The introduction or delivery for introduction into 
interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, tobacco product, or cosmetic that is 
adulterated or misbranded.”). 
 70. Id. § 352(f)(1)-(2). 
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effectiveness; the labeling on a drug approved for one use 
necessarily does not have adequate instructions for the new, 
unapproved use.71 Although the FDCA does not explicitly prohibit 
marketing a drug for off-label use, the FDA construes these 
provisions together and maintains that when a pharmaceutical sales 
representative promotes an off-label use, she intends to “caus[e] . . . 
[t]he introduction . . . into interstate commerce of [a] . . . drug . . . 
that is . . . misbranded” because the label does not contain “adequate 
directions for use.”72 The punishment for violation of § 331 is 
imprisonment for up to one year, a fine up to $1,000, or both.73 
Regulations promulgated by the FDA under the authority of the 
FDCA74 further this interpretation.75 Under 21 C.F.R. § 201.128, 
what constitutes an intended use is based on the objective intent of 
the pharmaceutical company or its representatives.76 There must be 
adequate labeling for the intended use on the drug’s packaging, and 
the FDA may infer intent from statements made by the 
representative.77 Pharmaceutical sales representatives’ statements to 
prescribing physicians when promoting drugs play a prominent role 
in determining whether the representative intended to sell a 
misbranded drug.78 If a sales representative makes statements to a 
physician about an off-label use, then his intent to introduce a 
misbranded drug into interstate commerce may be inferred from that 
statement.79 The FDA interprets these sections of the FDCA and its 
                                                 
 71. See id. § 321(p)(1) (“The term ‘new drug’ means—Any drug . . . the 
composition of which is such that such drug is not generally recognized, among 
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and 
effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the condition prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof . . . .”). 
 72. Id. §§ 331(a), 352(f)(1). 
 73. See id. § 333(a)(1). 
 74. See id. § 371. 
 75. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.5, 201.128 (2016). 
 76. See id. § 201.128. 
 77. See id. (“The words intended uses . . . refer to the objective intent of the 
persons legally responsible for the labeling of drugs. The intent is determined by 
such persons’ expressions or may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the 
distribution of the article. This objective intent may, for example, be shown by 
labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral or written statements by such persons or 
their representatives. It may be shown by the circumstances that the article is, with 
the knowledge of such persons or their representatives, offered and used for a 
purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised.”). 
 78. See id.  
 79. See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 28, at 3-4 (“To establish a 
manufacturer’s or distributor’s intended use for the product, FDA is not bound by 
the manufacturer’s or distributor’s subjective claims of intent, but rather can present 
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own regulations to mean that any speech promoting off-label uses is 
prohibited misbranding.80 
Although pharmaceutical sales representatives are prohibited 
from marketing drugs off-label under FDA policy and regulations, 
physicians may legally prescribe drugs for unapproved uses.81 
Physicians, as medical professionals, are not subject to FDA 
regulations.82 Off-label prescribing is widespread in the United 
States, and it may often be in the best interests of the patient.83 The 
FDA recognizes that physicians in any particular medical specialty 
might consider an off-label indication to be the appropriate standard 
of care.84 However, off-label prescribing can be dangerous for a 
patient when too little is known about how the drug works and 
whether it is safe or effective for a certain use.85 For that policy 
                                                                                                       
objective evidence, which may include a variety of direct and circumstantial 
evidence.”); see also id. at 4 n.12. 
 80. See id. at 4 (“Furthermore, an approved prescription drug that is 
intended for an unapproved use (whether referenced in labeling or not) would be 
considered misbranded, because the drug does not meet the regulatory exemptions 
from the requirement that its labeling bear ‘adequate directions for use.’” (quoting 
21 U.S.C. § 352(f))). 
 81. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 
2000); see also Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 
196, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Osborn, supra note 25, at 303. 
 82. See “Off-Label” and Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics, 
and Medical Devices - Information Sheet, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
regulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm126486.htm [https://perma.cc/RKR5-F6NL] (last 
updated Jan. 25, 2016) (“Good medical practice and the best interests of the patient 
require that physicians use legally available drugs, biologics and devices according 
to their best knowledge and judgment. If physicians use a product for an indication 
not in the approved labeling, they have the responsibility to be well informed about 
the product, to base its use on firm scientific rationale and on sound medical 
evidence, and to maintain records of the product’s use and effects.”); see also 
Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 15, at 316 (“[U]nder the current regulatory 
framework, the FDA asserts that it lacks legal authority to restrict the ability of 
doctors to prescribe drugs or devices for off-label uses.”). 
 83. See Dresser & Frader, supra note 27. 
 84. See Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal 
Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses 
of Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, FDA (Jan. 2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.htm [https://perma. 
cc/5RZF-J3WW] (“[O]ff-label uses or treatment regimens may be important and may 
even constitute a medically recognized standard of care. Accordingly, the public 
health may be advanced by healthcare professionals’ receipt of medical journal 
articles and medical or scientific reference publications on unapproved new uses of 
approved or cleared medical products that are truthful and not misleading.”). 
 85. See Dresser & Frader, supra note 27. 
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reason, the FDA has not repealed or amended its prohibition against 
off-label promotion by pharmaceutical representatives.86 
C. Policy Arguments from Both Perspectives: The FDA and 
Pharmaceutical Companies 
As recited in the FDCA, the purpose of the FDA is to “promote 
the public health by promptly and efficiently reviewing clinical 
research and taking appropriate action on the marketing of regulated 
products in a timely manner.”87 The FDA must, “with respect to such 
products, protect the public health by ensuring that . . . human . . . 
drugs are safe and effective.”88 The FDCA explicitly marks out two 
dominant areas in which the FDA must regulate drugs: (1) reviewing 
and approving drug safety and efficacy after clinical trials and 
(2) acting to guarantee that regulated drugs are marketed in 
accordance with the goals of safety and efficacy.89  
Proponents of the FDA’s prohibition on off-label 
pharmaceutical marketing argue that the prohibition is vital to 
accomplishing the FDA’s purpose because it directly supports the 
goal of drug safety and efficacy.90 The U.S. government has 
defended the FDA’s prohibition as necessary to protect the integrity 
of the FDA’s drug approval process.91 If pharmaceutical companies 
                                                 
 86. The FDA maintains that “[a]n approved drug that is marketed for an 
unapproved use (whether in labeling or not) is misbranded because the labeling of 
such drug does not include ‘adequate directions for use.’” Good Reprint Practices, 
supra note 84 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)). 
 87. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1) (2012). 
 88. Id. § 393(b)(2); see also Greene, supra note 23, at 240 (“[T]he very 
purpose of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [is] to protect the public by 
ensuring that pharmaceutical drugs are safe and effective for their intended uses.”). 
 89. See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1)-(2) (2012). 
 90. See Waxman, supra note 36, at 299 (“The FDCA’s restrictions on 
misleading and unsubstantiated promotional claims are central to its goal of 
preventing injury from dangerous and deceptive products. . . . As shown in a wealth 
of congressional documents, the history of the FDCA demonstrates beyond question 
that without premarket safety and effectiveness requirements, deceptive, 
unsubstantiated claims about health-related products proliferate, at a tremendous 
cost in human lives.”). 
 91. Brief for United States, supra note 68, at *59-60 (“The statutory 
mechanism for achieving that critical goal [of ensuring safe and effective drugs] is 
the new drug approval process in 21 U.S.C. § 355. In order to obtain FDA approval, 
a drug manufacturer must demonstrate the safety and efficacy of a new drug for each 
intended use through rigorous clinical trials.”); see also Klasmeier & Redish, supra 
note 15, at 316 (“[W]idespread off-label use of prescription drugs and devices 
conceivably undermines the FDA’s authority and deters manufacturers from seeking 
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could market off-label uses of drugs without obtaining FDA approval 
for those uses, then it “would radically undermine the incentives for 
manufacturers to go through the new drug approval process.”92 
Manufacturers would not obtain supplemental new drug approval for 
the off-label use, which would be the equivalent of allowing 
manufacturers to market and sell drugs for purposes that have not 
been proven safe and effective, defeating the FDA’s purpose.93 
Additionally, proponents of the off-label marketing ban argue 
that it should not be interpreted as a proscription of truthful and non-
misleading speech but as a preventative measure against harmful, 
false promotion that incidentally and necessarily prohibits some 
truthful speech.94 Above all, the public policy that drives and 
supports the FDA’s ban is the substantial government interest in 
protecting consumers from unsafe and ineffective drugs.95 The FDA 
attempts to prevent use of harmful drugs by ensuring that doctors do 
not rely on misleading promotional materials and speech from 
pharmaceutical sales representatives.96 
In contrast, pharmaceutical companies and other opponents 
who resist the FDA’s marketing restrictions argue that prescribing 
physicians need information on off-label uses to treat patients and 
that pharmaceutical companies are in the best position to provide 
information because they possess clinical trial results.97 The current 
                                                                                                       
on-label FDA approval for even widespread alternative uses. The fear, then, would 
be that the FDA’s initial approval could serve as a wedge to permit the industry’s 
equivalent of the Wild West, where the rule of law was seen only rarely.”). 
 92. Brief for United States, supra note 68, at *71. 
 93. See id. at *67; Greenwood, supra note 19, at 297. 
 94. See Greenwood, supra note 19, at 281, 297-98 (“Courts deciding 
commercial speech cases often repeat the refrain that false and misleading speech is 
entitled to no protection at all. And free speech advocates often claim that they are 
only concerned about a particular regulation to the extent that it applies to truthful 
speech. But there is no way to gain the benefits of false advertising law without 
sweeping in some truthful speech. . . . Given medicine’s high stakes, it is neither 
surprising nor unconstitutional that the prophylactic rule that governs drug claims 
suppresses some truthful speech.”). 
 95. See Waxman, supra note 36, at 299. 
 96. See Greenwood, supra note 19, at 291. 
 97. See Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 
196, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Such doctors . . . ‘need truthful and non-misleading 
information about these drugs to make informed decisions about what is best for 
their patients,’ but the ‘[FDA’s] current regime for regulating the flow of “off-label” 
information to doctors about prescription drugs . . . severely restricts medical 
professionals’ access to information from the source most knowledgeable about the 
drugs: the drug manufacturers . . . .’” (quoting Pl.’s Compl., Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 15-cv-3588, 2015 WL 2128126, ¶ 3 (S.D.N.Y. May 
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regulatory regime, opponents say, “will have significant implications 
for the practice of medicine, the development of new drugs, and the 
public health,” since the flow of information from pharmaceutical 
companies to physicians is dammed.98 Opponents of the FDA’s 
prohibition on off-label marketing also cite the fact that physicians 
regularly prescribe medications for unapproved uses as support for 
the argument that pharmaceutical representatives should be able to 
promote off-label.99 Opponents of the ban assert that the impact on 
the public is two-fold and negative: (1) the risk that off-label drugs 
will harm patients exists despite the ban because physicians continue 
to prescribe off-label with insufficient scientific data and (2) the 
beneficial information that pharmaceutical companies have 
discovered and compiled about off-label uses cannot be shared with 
doctors or patients.100  
The conflict between opponents and proponents of the FDA’s 
regulatory prohibition against off-label marketing thus stems from a 
disagreement about how to balance the public policy interests in 
public health and safety with interests in freedom of speech and 
information.101 The two camps disagree about whether inconclusive 
or incomplete clinical data relating to off-label uses should remain in 
the hands of the pharmaceutical companies that commissioned the 
studies or whether the companies should be unregulated in their 
ability to use the data as promotional material.102 While the conflict 
has not been settled at the public policy level, courts have weighed in 
on the issue formulated as a First Amendment challenge to the 
FDA’s restriction on commercial speech.103 
II. COURTS’ VIEWS ON FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
When the Supreme Court first addressed whether commercial 
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, the Court 
                                                                                                       
7, 2015)); Osborn, supra note 25, at 301 (“[T]he single greatest threat to the 
pharmaceutical industry may be the policy environment within the United States, 
which is restricting the ability of companies to speak truthfully with physicians 
about their products.”). 
 98. See Osborn, supra note 25, at 303. 
 99. See id. at 303-05. 
 100. See Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 15, at 316. 
 101. See infra Section I.C. 
 102. See infra Section I.C. 
 103. See infra Parts II and III. 
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determined that commercial speech did not merit protection because 
the value of the speech was so low compared to political or other 
public discourse.104 Over time, proponents of commercial speech 
spoke out against the Supreme Court’s decision.105 Now, courts 
afford commercial speech an intermediate level of protection, and 
restrictions on commercial speech are analyzed under a four-factor 
test that the Supreme Court crafted in Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.106 
A. The Early History of First Amendment Protection for Commercial 
Speech 
The Supreme Court first considered whether the First 
Amendment protects commercial speech in 1942, in Valentine v. 
Chrestensen.107 In Chrestensen, the Court upheld a New York City 
ordinance that prohibited distribution of commercial advertising 
handouts in public streets but that allowed distribution of 
informational or political handouts.108 In the decades following 
Chrestensen, legal scholars criticized the decision for denying 
protection to commercial speech.109 For example, Professor Martin 
Redish argued in 1971 that commercial speech should be afforded 
First Amendment protection based on its social value.110 Redish 
                                                 
 104. See infra Section II.A. 
 105. See infra Section II.A. 
 106. See infra Section II.B. 
 107. See 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
 108. See id. at 53, 55 (“If the respondent was attempting to use the streets of 
New York by distributing commercial advertising, the prohibition of the code 
provision was lawfully invoked against his conduct.”); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (reiterating that the Court distinguished 
between distribution of “information and . . . opinion” and “purely commercial 
advertising” in Valentine v. Chrestensen for First Amendment purposes).  
 109. See, e.g., George K. Gardner, Free Speech in Public Places, 36 B.U. L. 
REV. 239, 246 (1956) (finding that “[t]he opinion which the Court offers in support 
of [Chrestensen] can be justified only on the theory that the constitution values 
freedom of political propaganda more highly than it values the freedom to organize 
cooperation by means of trade,” but arguing that the Constitution protects 
commercial speech no less than religious, scientific, informative, or political 
speech); see also Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: 
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 
432 (1971). But see Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 956 (1963) (generally approving of the Supreme 
Court’s view of commercial speech in Chrestensen because of its relation to 
property rights rather than free expression). 
 110. See Redish, supra note 109, at 432. 
 Defending the Ban on Off-Label Marketing 1429 
contended that consumers benefit when provided with information 
about products because only then can they make knowledgeable, 
economically efficient decisions.111 However, the Supreme Court 
adhered to the holding in Chrestensen until the mid-1970s.112  
In 1975, the Court extended First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech under Bigelow v. Virginia.113 It acknowledged 
Chrestensen, but it characterized the holding in that case as 
“distinctly a limited one” that did not apply to all commercial 
advertising.114 The Bigelow Court corrected what it viewed as a 
misapprehension that advertising and other commercial speech were 
not entitled to First Amendment protection,115 holding instead that 
commercial speech merits some level of constitutional 
safeguarding.116 Specifically, the Court cited the informative nature 
of the advertisement under consideration117 as the interest that 
                                                 
 111. See id. at 433 (“If the individual is to achieve the maximum degree of 
material satisfaction permitted by his resources, he must be presented with as much 
information as possible concerning the relative merits of competing products.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 
432 n.12 (1963) (declining to consider whether a state law prohibiting optometry 
advertisements violated the First Amendment); see also, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (declining to 
address the argument that “commercial speech should be accorded a higher level of 
protection than Chrestensen and its progeny would suggest” and declining to 
“abrogate the distinction between commercial and other speech”). 
 113. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975). 
 114. Id. at 819-20. The Court did not overrule Chrestensen but indicated that 
the First Amendment protects commercial speech in some situations, stating:  
[T]he holding [of Chrestensen] is distinctly a limited one: the ordinance 
was upheld as a reasonable regulation of the manner in which commercial 
advertising could be distributed. The fact that it had the effect of banning a 
particular handbill does not mean that Chrestensen is authority for the 
proposition that all statutes regulating commercial advertising are immune 
from constitutional challenge. The case obviously does not support any 
sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per se. 
Id.
 115. Id. at 819-20, 825. 
 116. Id. at 826 (“Advertising is not . . . stripped of all First Amendment 
protection. The relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services 
does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.”). 
 117. Id. at 821-22. The advertisement offered assistance in seeking a legal 
abortion in New York to people in Virginia, id. at 812, and in the Court’s view:  
[It] did more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained 
factual material of clear “public interest.” Portions of its message, most 
prominently the lines, “Abortions are now legal in New York. There are 
no residency requirements,” involve the exercise of the freedom of 
communicating information and disseminating opinion. Viewed in its 
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warranted First Amendment protection.118 The Court advanced a 
balancing test, weighing the government interest in regulating speech 
against the First Amendment interest, as the method by which to 
determine whether specific speech is protected.119 One year later, in 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., the Court reaffirmed Bigelow and made definitively 
clear that commercial speech is “not ‘wholly outside the protection 
of the First Amendment.’”120 The Court effectively brought 
commercial speech within the realm of First Amendment 
jurisprudence through Bigelow and Virginia State Board,121 but it 
soon redefined the test used to analyze restrictions on commercial 
speech.122 
B. The Central Hudson Four-Factor Test for Laws Restricting 
Commercial Speech 
In 1980, the Court again addressed protection of commercial 
speech.123 In Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission of 
New York, an electrical utility company sued the Public Service 
Commission of New York, alleging that its ban on promotional 
advertising for electrical utilities violated the First Amendment.124 
The Commission argued that the ban conserved energy by preventing 
electricity companies from encouraging energy consumption.125 
Contrary to the decisions of the state courts below,126 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the ban violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.127 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, emphasized 
that commercial speech derives First Amendment protection from its 
                                                                                                       
entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential interest and 
value to a diverse audience.
Id. at 822. 
 118. Id. at 821-22. 
 119. Id. at 826. 
 120. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 776 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 121. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 
U.S. at 770. 
 122. See infra Section II.B for a discussion of the Central Hudson test for 
commercial speech. 
 123. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
557, 558 (1980). 
 124. Id. at 558-59. 
 125. Id. at 558-60. 
 126. Id. at 560-61.  
 127. Id. at 561, 571-72. 
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role in ensuring free circulation of information.128 “Consequently,” 
the Court stated, “there can be no constitutional objection to the 
suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform 
the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of 
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it or 
commercial speech related to illegal activity.”129 In the Court’s view, 
then, only some commercial speech merits First Amendment 
protection.130  
The Court developed a four-factor test to determine whether a 
law that restricts commercial speech violates the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of freedom of speech.131 First, a court must consider 
whether the First Amendment protects the speech; to merit protection 
initially, the speech must concern lawful activity and must not be 
misleading.132 Second, a court must consider whether the government 
interest asserted as justification for the restriction is substantial.133 
Third, a court must consider “whether the regulation directly 
advances the governmental interest asserted.”134 Fourth, a court must 
consider whether the regulation is only as extensive as necessary to 
achieve the interest.135 This test resembles intermediate scrutiny, a 
                                                 
 128. Id. at 561-63 (“Commercial expression not only serves the economic 
interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in 
the fullest possible dissemination of information. . . . The First Amendment’s 
concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of 
advertising.”). 
 129. Id. at 563-64. 
 130. Id. at 562-64. 
 131. Id. at 564-66. 
 132. Id. at 566. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. The Central Hudson Court phrased the fourth factor of the inquiry as 
“whether [the regulation] is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
interest.” Id. As to the first step, the Central Hudson Court ruled that advertising for 
electrical utilities is commercial speech protected by the First Amendment because it 
is neither “deceptive [n]or related to unlawful activity.” Id. at 566-68, 566 n.9. In the 
second step of the analysis, the Court found that the government’s interests in 
energy conservation and ensuring fair, efficient utility rates were substantial. Id. at 
568-69. In the third step, the Court found that the ban on electrical utility advertising 
directly advanced the government’s interest in energy conservation because of the 
“immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity.” Id. at 569. 
However, the Court found that the ban was more restrictive than necessary to further 
the government’s interest in energy conservation because the ban also prohibited 
advertising that would promote alternative, more efficient modes of consumption. 
See id. at 569-70. Therefore, the Court held that the Public Service Commission’s 
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standard of review more deferential to the government than strict 
scrutiny, because commercial speech is less valuable than other types 
of pure speech.136 
In 1989, the Court clarified the parameters of the fourth step of 
the Central Hudson analysis in Board of Trustees of the State 
University of New York v. Fox.137 The Court declared that the 
government need not choose the least restrictive means to preserve 
its interests for a challenged regulation to be “only as extensive as 
necessary.”138 Rather, the Court rejected that strict interpretation of 
“necessary” and stated that Central Hudson “requires something 
short of a least-restrictive-means standard.”139 The fit between the 
means and the ends of the regulation must only be a “reasonable” 
fit.140 The Court based this decision on the grounds that commercial 
speech merits less protection than other types of speech.141 
Today, Central Hudson’s four-factor test defines commercial 
speech doctrine and limits the government’s ability to restrict 
commercial speech.142 Commercial speech is considered a low-value 
                                                                                                       
moratorium on electrical-utility advertising violated the First Amendment because it 
was too restrictive. See id. at 571-72. 
 136. See id. at 562-63 (“The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to 
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”); see also 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 794 (2007) (“Commercial 
speech regulations, however, may be, and generally are, content-based, but because 
of the lower constitutional value of such speech, only intermediate scrutiny 
applies.”).  
 137. See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-77 
(1989). 
 138. See id. 
 139. Id. at 477. 
 140. See id. at 480 (“What our decisions require is a ‘“fit” between the 
legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,’ a fit that is not 
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best 
disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served,’ that 
employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but, as we have put it in the other 
contexts discussed above, a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired 
objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge 
what manner of regulation may best be employed.” (quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico 
Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 
(1982))). 
 141. See id. at 477 (“Our jurisprudence has emphasized that ‘commercial 
speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate 
position in the scale of First Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of 
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.’” 
(quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978))).  
 142. See supra text accompanying notes 131-36. 
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type of speech, yet Central Hudson is only slightly deferential to the 
government.143 When the Second Circuit first applied Central
Hudson to the FDA’s prohibition on off-label pharmaceutical 
promotion, it came out in favor of commercial speech over drug 
regulation.144  
III. COURTS’ VIEWS ON FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR OFF-
LABEL PROMOTION 
The Second Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York have both addressed issues regarding 
pharmaceutical companies’ off-label promotion of drugs.145 The 
Second Circuit found that the FDA’s prohibition on off-label 
marketing violated the First Amendment under the Central Hudson 
analysis for commercial speech.146 Following the Second Circuit, the 
Southern District of New York permitted a pharmaceutical company 
to promote a drug off-label using truthful and non-misleading 
speech.147 
A. United States v. Caronia: The Second Circuit Debates the Off-
Label Marketing Ban 
In United States v. Caronia, the Second Circuit addressed 
whether the FDA’s policy of prohibiting pharmaceutical sales 
representatives from marketing off-label uses of drugs violated the 
First Amendment.148 Alfred Caronia, a pharmaceutical sales 
representative, was prosecuted for conspiring “to introduce a 
misbranded drug into interstate commerce,”149 a prohibited act under 
the FDCA.150 Caronia had been hired specifically to promote the drug 
Xyrem, which the FDA approved to treat patients with narcolepsy 
who experienced either cataplexy or excessive daytime sleepiness.151 
                                                 
 143. See supra text accompanying note 136. 
 144. See infra Part III. 
 145. See infra Sections III.A-B. 
 146. See infra Section III.A. 
 147. See infra Section III.B. 
 148. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See supra Section I.B. 
 151. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 155-56; see also Xyrem, JAZZ 
PHARMACEUTICALS, https://www.xyrem.com/?gclid=CjwKEAjwh8exBRDyyqqH9pvf1 
ncSJAAu4OE3cfCdAd2-Cai3N0YLrMRM3zfn7ogK8iDrh0aGraAGOhoCRevw_wcB 
[https://perma.cc/DDE8-SXL7] (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) (“Xyrem is a prescription 
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The FDA categorized Xyrem as a Schedule III controlled 
substance,152 a category of drugs that have a moderate to high 
potential for abuse and an accepted medical use in the United 
States.153 The drug information label contains a warning that Xyrem 
is a central nervous system depressant and that abuse can cause 
“adverse reactions, including seizure, respiratory depression, 
decreases in the level of consciousness, coma, and death.”154 Despite 
Xyrem’s risks, Caronia promoted the drug to a physician for 
unapproved uses in a conversation captured in an audio recording.155 
Caronia indicated that although Xyrem was only approved for 
cataplexy and excessive daytime sleepiness, “it’s going to insomnia, 
Fibromyalgia[,] periodic leg movement, restless leg . . . Parkinson’s 
and . . . other sleep disorders are underway such as MS,” uses for 
which Xyrem had not been approved.156 
Before and at trial, Caronia argued that the government was 
prosecuting him for promotional speech that was protected by the 
First Amendment.157 The government argued, however, that it 
prosecuted Caronia “for the unlawful conduct of misbranding and 
conspiring to misbrand a drug and not for his promotional speech, 
the latter of which . . . only constituted proof of Xyrem’s intended 
use.”158 The district court agreed that the government was 
prosecuting Caronia for promotional speech rather than conduct, but 
it found that the regulation of commercial speech did not violate the 
First Amendment.159 The jury found Caronia guilty of conspiring to 
misbrand.160 
                                                                                                       
medicine used to treat the following symptoms in people who fall asleep frequently 
during the day, often at unexpected times (narcolepsy): suddenly weak or paralyzed 
muscles when they feel strong emotions (cataplexy)[;] excessive daytime sleepiness 
(EDS) in people who have narcolepsy.”). 
 152. See JAZZ PHARM., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION 1 (Sept. 
2016) [hereinafter XYREM PRESCRIBING INFORMATION], http://pp.jazzpharma.com/pi/ 
xyrem.en.USPI.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AYT-3WV2]. 
 153. See Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 202(b)(3)(A)-(B), 
84 Stat. 1236, 1247 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2012)). 
 154. XYREM PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 152, at 3. 
 155. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 156. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id. at 158. 
 158. Id. (citing United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 394-95 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008)).  
 159. See id. (citing Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 395, 401-02).  
 160. See id. at 159. 
 Defending the Ban on Off-Label Marketing 1435 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed Caronia’s First 
Amendment claim de novo.161 First, based on the principle of 
constitutional avoidance, the court concluded that the FDCA and 
FDA regulations do not prohibit off-label marketing “because such a 
construction would raise First Amendment concerns.”162 Yet, like the 
district court, the Second Circuit found that the government had 
indeed prosecuted Caronia for his promotional speech under the 
FDCA provisions.163 The court refused to accept the government’s 
argument that it used Caronia’s speech only as evidence of intent to 
misbrand, rather than that it identified the speech itself as 
prohibited.164 
Finding that the government prosecuted Caronia for his 
promotional speech, the Second Circuit held that the prosecution 
violated the First Amendment, and the court vacated Caronia’s 
conviction.165 The court presented an assessment of First Amendment 
doctrine and drew incompatible conclusions about which standard of 
scrutiny to apply to the FDA’s restriction on off-label marketing.166 
First, the court concluded that strict scrutiny applied because the 
speech prohibition was both content-based and speaker-based.167 
Second, and despite its first conclusion, the Second Circuit 
proceeded to apply the form of intermediate scrutiny created in 
Central Hudson for commercial speech,168 concluding “that the 
‘outcome is the same whether a special commercial speech inquiry 
                                                 
 161. See id. at 160 (citing Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 89 
(2d Cir. 2010)).  
 162. Id.; see id. (noting that “[w]hile the FDCA makes it a crime to misbrand 
or conspire to misbrand a drug, the statute and its accompanying regulations do not 
expressly prohibit or criminalize off-label promotion. Rather, the FDCA and FDA 
regulations reference ދpromotionތ only as evidence of a drug’s intended use” 
(citations omitted)). 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. at 160-61. 
 165. Id. at 162, 169. 
 166. Id. at 163-64.  
 167. Id. at 163 (citing the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell 
v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011)). Application of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Sorrell to the facts of Caronia is inapposite because the issue in Sorrell 
addressed a state law that “restricts the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records 
that reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors,” Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 
2659, rather than off-label pharmaceutical marketing. For an analysis of commercial 
speech as content-based and speaker-based, see Robert Post, The Constitutional 
Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2000), in which Post 
describes the frustration of attempting to characterize commercial speech based on 
the speaker or the content, since at times it can be characterized by both and neither. 
 168. See supra Section II.B.
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or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.’”169 Under either 
method, the court found that the government’s prosecution of 
Caronia for his speech failed heightened scrutiny.170  
Proceeding through the four-factor Central Hudson analysis,171 
the Second Circuit found under the first prong that Caronia’s 
commercial speech merited First Amendment protection because it 
discussed off-label drug use, a lawful activity, and because 
“promotion of off-label drug use is not in and of itself false or 
misleading.”172 However, the court noted that the government did not 
argue in its brief that Caronia’s speech was about unlawful activity 
or that it was false or misleading.173 Under the second prong, the 
court found that the government’s interests in protecting safety, 
health, and the integrity of the regulatory drug approval process were 
substantial interests.174 The court gave in-depth consideration to the 
government’s theory of prosecution under the third and fourth 
prongs.175 
Central Hudson’s third prong examines whether the 
government regulation or action directly advances the government’s 
asserted interests.176 The court reasoned that the government’s view 
of the FDCA as prohibiting off-label promotion does not further its 
interests in protecting the public or in preserving the integrity of the 
FDA drug approval process because physicians can legally prescribe 
drugs to patients for off-label uses.177 The court criticized the 
regulations for being speaker-based, since only pharmaceutical 
                                                 
 169. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 164 (quoting Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667). See infra 
Part IV for an argument that the FDA’s prohibition on off-label marketing survives 
intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson. 
 170. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 164-69. 
 171. See supra Section II.B. 
 172. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 165.  
 173. Id. at 165 n.10. 
 174. Id. at 166 (“Second, the government’s asserted interests in drug safety 
and public health are substantial. Specifically, the government asserts an interest in 
preserving the effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s drug approval process, and 
an interest in reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.”). 
 175. Id. at 166-69. 
 176. See supra text accompanying note 134. 
 177. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166 (“In effect, even if pharmaceutical 
manufacturers are barred from off-label promotion, physicians can prescribe, and 
patients can use, drugs for off-label purposes. As off-label drug use itself is not 
prohibited, it does not follow that prohibiting the truthful promotion of off-label 
drug usage by a particular class of speakers would directly further the government’s 
goals of preserving the efficacy and integrity of the FDA’s drug approval process 
and reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.”). 
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manufacturers and representatives are contemplated by the FDA’s 
ban.178 Additionally, the court reasoned that the prohibition actually 
harms patients who would benefit if their physicians could get 
pertinent information on off-label uses from pharmaceutical 
companies.179 Based on its conclusions under the first prong that off-
label promotion is not inherently false or misleading180 and that 
Caronia’s promotional speech was not false or misleading, the court 
asserted that the free flow of information about off-label uses could 
only be beneficial.181 
Central Hudson’s fourth prong examines whether the 
regulation is only as extensive as necessary to achieve the interest.182 
As to this inquiry, the Caronia court found that the absolute, criminal 
prohibition against off-label marketing was more extensive than 
necessary to achieve the government’s interests.183 The court 
grounded its conclusion on the perceived availability of feasible 
alternatives for implementation by the FDA, such as teaching 
physicians to distinguish true from false or misleading speech, 
developing warning systems and safety schedules for off-label uses, 
requiring registration of all intended uses upon granting initial 
approval, and capping the number of issuable off-label 
prescriptions.184 
Under a Central Hudson analysis, the court found that the 
FDA’s prosecution of Caronia under the FDCA for truthful, non-
misleading speech violated the First Amendment.185 The court also 
found that the FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA did not directly 
advance the government’s interests and was more extensive than 
necessary to achieve the interests.186 Rather, the Second Circuit held 
that “the government cannot prosecute pharmaceutical manufacturers 
and their representatives under the FDCA for speech promoting the 
                                                 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. (“[P]rohibiting off-label promotion by a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer while simultaneously allowing off-label use ‘paternalistically’ 
interferes with the ability of physicians and patients to receive potentially relevant 
treatment information; such barriers to information about off-label use could inhibit, 
to the public’s detriment, informed and intelligent treatment decisions.”). 
 180. See supra text accompanying note 172. 
 181. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 167. 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 135, 137-41. 
 183. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 167. 
 184. Id. at 168. 
 185. Id. at 166-68. 
 186. Id. 
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lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved drug.”187 Recently, the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York followed the 
Second Circuit in its holding.188 
B. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Administration: An 
Extension of Caronia 
In August of 2015, in Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration, the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York applied and extended the Second Circuit’s holding in 
Caronia when it granted a preliminary injunction to Amarin, the 
plaintiff–pharmaceutical company, to prevent the FDA from 
following through with threats to prosecute Amarin for 
misbranding.189 The FDA had approved Amarin’s drug Vascepa to 
treat patients with high triglyceride levels190 at risk for pancreatitis 
and cardiovascular disease,191 but it rejected Amarin’s supplemental 
new drug application for approval of Vascepa for a second use: 
reducing the risk of cardiovascular disease in patients with 
persistently high triglyceride levels.192 The FDA responded that 
Amarin’s clinical trials were inconclusive about the benefits of the 
drug for the second use.193 Although Amarin’s study revealed that 
Vascepa effectively reduced triglycerides in patients with 
persistently high levels, the FDA found that Amarin’s study did not 
prove a direct correlation between lower triglyceride levels and 
reduced risk of cardiovascular disease.194 In a final response letter to 
Amarin, the FDA warned that Vascepa “may be considered to be 
misbranded under the [FDCA]” if Amarin marketed Vascepa for use 
                                                 
 187. Id. at 169. 
 188. See infra Section III.B. 
 189. See Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 
196, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  
 190. Triglycerides are defined as “any of a group of lipids that are esters 
formed from one molecule of glycerol and three molecules of one or more fatty 
acids, are widespread in adipose tissue, and commonly circulate in the blood in the 
form of lipoproteins—called also neutral fat.” Triglyceride, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
MED. DICTIONARY, http://c.merriam-webster.com/medlineplus/triglyceride [https:// 
perma.cc/HLD3-FC3P] (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
 191. See Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 209. 
 192. Id. at 210-12. 
 193. Id. at 211-12. 
 194. Id. 
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in patients with persistently high levels using the results of the 
inconclusive study.195 
After the FDA rejected Amarin’s supplemental new drug 
application, Amarin filed a complaint against the FDA, arguing that 
the FDA’s ban on off-label marketing and its threatened prosecution 
for misbranding violated the First Amendment.196 Amarin alleged 
that it wanted to market Vascepa using truthful and non-misleading 
statements based on the results of its clinical trials.197 Amarin’s 
suggested marketing materials included three specific statements 
about Vascepa’s efficacy in lowering triglyceride levels and about 
the results of Amarin’s recent clinical study, a summary of the 
results of the study, peer-reviewed scientific articles relating to the 
medical field, and disclosure statements about Vascepa’s off-label 
status and possible effect on cardiovascular disease.198 Based on the 
factual, unbiased, and academic nature of the statements and 
materials Amarin proposed to use promotionally, the court granted 
Amarin preliminary relief, declaring that “Amarin may engage in 
truthful and non-misleading speech promoting the off-label use of 
Vascepa . . . and under Caronia, such speech may not form the basis 
of a prosecution for misbranding.”199 The district court’s ruling in 
favor of Amarin reinforced the Second Circuit’s decision in Caronia 
that under the First Amendment the FDA cannot prevent 
pharmaceutical manufacturers from making truthful, non-misleading 
statements about off-label drugs.200  
After the courts’ decisions in Caronia and Amarin, it is unclear 
to what extent the FDA’s prohibition against off-label marketing by 
pharmaceutical companies retains any force.201 The Caronia court 
                                                 
 195. Id. at 212. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. Amarin attached its suggested marketing statements as exhibits to 
the complaint, but the FDA did not have an opportunity to review the statements 
before Amarin filed suit. Id. at 215-16. 
 198. Id. at 214-15. 
 199. Id. at 237. 
 200. Id. at 224 (“In light of the parties’ conflicting readings of Caronia and 
the FDA’s position that it may bring a misbranding action against a manufacturer 
based solely on truthful and non-misleading speech evincing the intent to promote 
an off-label use, the Court has closely reviewed Caronia. The Court’s considered 
and firm view is that, under Caronia, the FDA may not bring such an action based 
on truthful promotional speech alone, consistent with the First Amendment. A fair 
reading of that decision refutes the FDA’s view that the Second Circuit’s ruling was 
limited to the facts of Caronia’s particular case.”). 
 201. Although the Second Circuit held that the FDA’s ban violates the First 
Amendment, other circuits have declined to follow that holding. See, for example, 
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declined to construe the FDCA and FDA regulations to prohibit off-
label promotion, instead choosing to decide whether prosecution for 
off-label marketing violates the First Amendment.202 Using the 
Central Hudson test for restrictions on commercial speech, the 
Second Circuit held that such prosecution was unconstitutional.203 
The Amarin court affirmed and clarified Caronia’s holding, asserting 
that the FDA could not criminalize truthful, non-misleading off-label 
promotion.204 
IV. IN DEFENSE OF THE BAN ON OFF-LABEL PROMOTION: 
PERMITTING SOME COMMERCIAL SPEECH ON OFF-LABEL USES IS A 
SOLUTION 
Although the Caronia and Amarin courts found the FDA’s ban 
to be unconstitutional,205 the Caronia court misapplied the four-factor 
Central Hudson test and erroneously found that the FDA’s 
prohibition on off-label marketing violates the First Amendment.206 
Contrary to the Caronia and Amarin courts’ findings, the FDA’s ban 
                                                                                                       
Ramirez v. Medtronic Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 977, 990 n.8 (D. Ariz. 2013), in which 
the United States District Court for the District of Arizona stated: 
The Court recognizes that the Second Circuit has determined that a 
prohibition on off-label promotion can raise First Amendment concerns. 
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 160-69 (2d Cir. 2012). The Ninth 
Circuit, however, has assumed that off-label promotion does violate 
federal law. Carson v. Depuy Spine, Inc., 365 [F. App’x] 812, 815 (9th 
Cir. 2010). Medtronic has not directly attacked the constitutionality of 
such a ban in this preliminary proceeding, and the Court therefore assumes 
for purposes of this Motion that the ban on off-label promotion remains 
constitutionally viable. 
Id. Therefore, the constitutionality of the FDA’s ban remains contested. See id. 
 202. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven 
if speech can be used as evidence of a drug’s intended use, we decline to adopt the 
government’s construction of the FDCA’s misbranding provisions to prohibit 
manufacturer promotion alone as it would unconstitutionally restrict free speech. We 
construe the misbranding provisions of the FDCA as not prohibiting and 
criminalizing the truthful off-label promotion of FDA-approved prescription 
drugs. . . . We conclude simply that the government cannot prosecute 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives under the FDCA for speech 
promoting the lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved drug.”). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 237 (“Specifically the Court declares that . . . 
Amarin may engage in truthful and non-misleading speech promoting the off-label use of 
Vascepa, i.e., to treat patients with persistently high triglycerides, and under Caronia, 
such speech may not form the basis of a prosecution for misbranding . . . .”). 
 205. See supra Part III. 
 206. See infra Section IV.A. 
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meets the requirements of Central Hudson for a governmental 
restriction on commercial speech because speech promoting the 
introduction of misbranded drugs into interstate commerce is not 
protected speech.207 Despite the constitutionality of the ban, a conflict 
remains between the FDA’s and pharmaceutical companies’ 
competing interests.208 The solution to the informational deadlock 
that results from the ban is to allow pharmaceutical companies to 
generate and disseminate factual, unbiased statements about off-label 
uses of drugs based on the results of clinical trials.209 
A. The Caronia Court’s Mistake: The First Amendment Does Not 
Protect Off-Label Promotion 
In United States v. Caronia, the Second Circuit incorrectly 
applied the Central Hudson analysis for commercial speech to the 
FDA’s prohibition against off-label marketing by pharmaceutical 
sales representatives.210 As an initial matter, the court erroneously 
applied a standard of review that more closely resembled strict 
scrutiny than intermediate scrutiny.211 Under Central Hudson,212 any 
law restricting commercial speech must be scrutinized under the 
four-prong analysis that resembles intermediate scrutiny.213 The 
Second Circuit, however, took into consideration the fact that the 
FDA’s regulation was content-based and speaker-based,214 which led 
it to use a standard of review closer to strict scrutiny.215 
                                                 
 207. See infra Section IV.A.
 208. See infra Section IV.B. 
 209. See infra Section IV.B. 
 210. See supra Sections II.B, III.A. 
 211. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“The government’s construction of the FDCA’s misbranding provisions to prohibit 
and criminalize the promotion of off-label drug use by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers is content- and speaker-based, and, therefore, subject to heightened 
scrutiny.”); see also supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra Section II.B. 
 213. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
562-63 (1980) (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to 
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. . . . The 
protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of 
the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.”); see 
supra text accompanying notes 131-36. 
 214. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166 (“As off-label drug use itself is not prohibited, 
it does not follow that prohibiting the truthful promotion of off-label drug usage by a 
particular class of speakers would directly further the government’s goals of 
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Under contemporary First Amendment commercial speech 
doctrine, it is irrelevant whether the restriction is content-based or 
speaker-based because commercial speech is necessarily 
characterized both by its content and by its speaker, and therefore 
any restriction will also be based on those characteristics.216 Any 
restriction on commercial speech is speaker-based: The restriction 
will affect only those seeking to sell something in the market, 
whether a product or the speech itself, because otherwise the speech 
would not be characterized as commercial.217 Any restriction on 
commercial speech is also content-based: The restriction will affect 
only speech that engages in “commercial advertising [or] . . . 
‘propose[s] a commercial transaction’” because otherwise the speech 
would not be characterized as commercial.218 The Supreme Court 
took these realities into account when crafting the Central Hudson 
analysis for restrictions on commercial speech,219 and the Court 
concluded that despite its discriminatory nature, commercial speech 
would be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny220 because of its 
“lower constitutional value” compared to other speech.221 
                                                                                                       
preserving the efficacy and integrity of the FDA’s drug approval process and 
reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.”). 
 215. Id. at 163 (“Content-based speech restrictions are subject to ‘strict 
scrutiny’—that is, the government must show that the regulation at issue is narrowly 
tailored to serve or promote a compelling government interest. . . . Meanwhile, non-
content-based regulation and regulation of commercial speech—expression solely 
related to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience—are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny.”). 
 216. See Bhagwat, supra note 136, at 794 (“Commercial speech regulations, 
however, may be, and generally are, content-based, but because of the lower 
constitutional value of such speech, only intermediate scrutiny applies.”). Cf. Post, 
supra note 167, at 5-6 (explaining the difficulty in characterizing commercial speech 
based on the speaker or the content, since at times it can be characterized by both 
and neither). 
 217. Cf. Post, supra note 167, at 7-8 (arguing that commercial speech should 
not be defined based on its characteristics as content- or speaker-based, but rather 
that commercial speech should be awarded First Amendment protection based on its 
contribution to public discourse, which has constitutional value because it allows for 
participation in democracy).
 218. See Bhagwat, supra note 136, at 793-95 (citing Thompson v. W. States 
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002)) (comparing content-based and content-neutral 
speech regulations). 
 219. See supra Sections II.A, II.B. 
 220. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
573 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“The Court asserts that ‘a four-part analysis 
has developed’ from our decisions concerning commercial speech. Under this four-
part test a restraint on commercial ‘communication [that] is neither misleading nor 
related to unlawful activity’ is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, and 
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Although the Caronia court ultimately proceeded to apply the 
four-factor form of intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson, 
consideration of the strict scrutiny standard of review influenced how 
rigorously the court critiqued the FDA’s choice of regulation.222 For 
example, under the third prong, the court considered the fact that the 
prohibition was speaker-based and found that such a discriminatory 
regulation did not directly advance the interests of the government.223 
The court’s emphasis on the speaker-based nature of the restriction224 
demonstrates that it gave less deference to the government than is 
required by the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test.225 
1. The Caronia Court’s Incorrect Application of the First 
Central Hudson Factor  
Under the first step of the Central Hudson test, the Second 
Circuit concluded that the First Amendment protected Caronia’s 
commercial speech because (1) off-label promotion by 
pharmaceutical companies is not inherently false or misleading and 
(2) the speech contained information about off-label drug use, which 
is a lawful activity.226 The conclusion that off-label promotion is not 
inherently misleading misrepresents the thrust of the first Central
Hudson factor: Although it may be true that off-label promotion is 
not inherently false or misleading, the question under Central
Hudson is not whether a broad category of commercial speech is 
inherently false or misleading, but rather whether the commercial 
                                                                                                       
suppression is permitted whenever it ‘directly advances’ a ‘substantial’ 
governmental interest and is ‘not more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
interest.’ I agree with the Court that this level of intermediate scrutiny is appropriate 
for a restraint on commercial speech designed to protect consumers from misleading 
or coercive speech, or a regulation related to the time, place, or manner of 
commercial speech.”). 
 221. Bhagwat, supra note 136, at 794. 
 222. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 165-67 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 223. Id. at 166 (“In effect, even if pharmaceutical manufacturers are barred 
from off-label promotion, physicians can prescribe, and patients can use, drugs for 
off-label purposes. As off-label drug use itself is not prohibited, it does not follow 
that prohibiting the truthful promotion of off-label drug usage by a particular class 
of speakers would directly further the government’s goals of preserving the efficacy 
and integrity of the FDA’s drug approval process and reducing patient exposure to 
unsafe and ineffective drugs.” (emphasis added)). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 226. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 165. 
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speech is “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”227 
Speech that is inherently false or misleading would never come 
under the purview of Central Hudson because such speech is not 
informative; the only reason the First Amendment protects 
commercial speech is to preserve its informative function.228 Rather, 
Justice Powell’s statement in Central Hudson that “[t]he government 
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public 
than to inform it” implies a balancing test to determine whether the 
regulated speech could be reasonably expected to be false or 
misleading.229  
In Caronia, the court should have examined whether off-label 
pharmaceutical promotion by sales representatives is “more likely to 
deceive [physicians] than to inform [them].”230 One public policy that 
supports the ban on off-label promotion—and one of the overarching 
goals of the FDCA—is to protect public health and safety by 
preventing doctors from relying on promotional materials with false 
claims or misleading information about a drug’s uses and efficacy.231 
The FDCA, the FDA’s statutory mandate, requires the FDA to 
review clinical trials before approving drugs as safe and effective, 
and to regulate drug marketing for the same purpose.232 This mandate 
demonstrates that Congress believed that before clinical trials are 
complete, there is insufficient information to prove that the drugs 
will not harm the public.233 Although not all off-label promotion is 
                                                 
 227. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (“The First Amendment’s concern for 
commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising. 
Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of 
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful 
activity.” (citations omitted)). 
 228. Id. at 561-63 (“Commercial expression not only serves the economic 
interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in 
the fullest possible dissemination of information. . . . The First Amendment’s 
concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of 
advertising.”). 
 229. Id. at 563. 
 230. Id. 
 231. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1)-(2) (2012); see also Greene, supra note 23, at 
240 (“[T]he very purpose of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) [is] 
to protect the public by ensuring that pharmaceutical drugs are safe and effective for 
their intended uses.”); Greenwood, supra note 19, at 292 (“A study of 106 
statements about drugs made by pharmaceutical sales representatives over the course 
of thirteen lunchtime presentations in 1993 found that eleven percent of the 
statements were inaccurate, and that physicians generally failed to recognize the 
inaccuracies.”). 
 232. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1). 
 233. See id. § 393(b)(1)-(2). 
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false or misleading, pharmaceutical representatives’ motivation to 
sell more drugs likely biases their off-label commercial speech.234 
Pharmaceutical representatives’ off-label use pitches encourage 
physicians to prescribe drugs for unapproved uses, irrespective of 
whether the information conveyed is complete or based on 
conclusive studies.235 The Caronia court should have concluded that 
off-label pharmaceutical marketing is more likely to deceive than to 
inform236 and that the First Amendment therefore does not protect 
off-label pharmaceutical marketing.237  
The court’s second conclusion, that the First Amendment 
protected the speech because it concerned lawful off-label drug use 
was a questionable decision.238 Under Central Hudson, commercial 
speech “must concern lawful activity” to merit First Amendment 
protection.239 While off-label prescribing is undoubtedly legal,240 the 
                                                 
 234. See Dresser & Frader, supra note 27, at 478, for a brief overview of 
how market forces drive pharmaceutical manufacturers’ decisions. See id. at 476, for 
an explanation of the competing interests involved in off-label prescribing and the 
effects of those interests on availability and accuracy of information. Dresser & 
Frader state, “In the current situation, the medical community has primary 
responsibility for determining when off-label prescribing is appropriate for patients. 
But appropriate off-label prescribing can be challenging for physicians today, 
because of time pressures, information overload, and the involvement of [the 
pharmaceutical] industry in research and education about off-label uses.” Id.
 235. See, for example, Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. United States Food and Drug 
Administration, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), in which Amarin 
Pharma, Inc. wanted to market its drug Vascepa for off-label use in patients with 
persistently high triglyceride levels as a treatment to “prevent major cardiovascular 
events in high-risk patients.” In that case, “the FDA refused to approve Amarin’s 
proposed new use for Vascepa,” because “the ‘clinical rationale,’ or premise, of 
the . . . study had been that reducing triglyceride levels in that population would 
reduce the risk of cardiovascular events[,] [b]ut the results of the clinical trials 
involving other drugs that had also reduced triglyceride levels had yielded 
‘insufficient data to support a drug-induced change in serum [triglycerides] as a 
surrogate for reducing [cardiovascular] risk in [that] population.’” Id. at 212. The 
results of the clinical trial did not conclusively determine whether the off-label use 
reduced the risk of cardiovascular disease. Id. 
 236. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
557, 563 (1980). 
 237. Cf. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 2012). Instead, 
the Caronia court took a different approach and concluded that “the promotion of 
off-label drug use is not in and of itself false or misleading.” Id.  
 238. Id. 
 239. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 240. Good Reprint Practices, supra note 84 (“[O]ff-label uses or treatment 
regimens may be important and may even constitute a medically recognized 
standard of care.”). 
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acts of introducing misbranded drugs into interstate commerce and 
causing the introduction of misbranded drugs into interstate 
commerce are both prohibited.241 Arguably, a pharmaceutical sales 
representative who markets a drug off-label is engaging in speech 
that concerns his own illegal activity, that is, promoting or causing 
the interstate sale of a misbranded drug under the FDCA.242 If the 
Caronia court had found that the speech related to unlawful activity, 
then it would have ended its analysis and upheld the FDA’s 
prohibition.243  
2. The Caronia Court’s Correct Application of the Second 
Central Hudson Factor  
The Caronia court did not end its inquiry at the first factor of 
the Central Hudson test because it found that the First Amendment 
protected off-label marketing.244 The court continued its analysis at 
the second step of the inquiry: whether the asserted government 
interest is substantial.245 The court concluded that “the government’s 
asserted interests in drug safety and public health are substantial. 
Specifically, the government asserts an interest in preserving the 
effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s drug approval process, and 
an interest in reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective 
drugs.”246 The court correctly applied this step of the inquiry and 
moved on to the next factor.247 
3. The Caronia Court’s Incorrect Application of the Third 
Central Hudson Factor  
The third Central Hudson factor is “whether the regulation 
directly advances the governmental interest asserted.”248 The Caronia 
court held that the FDA’s prohibition against off-label marketing 
does not directly advance the FDA’s asserted interests for several 
reasons.249 First, it found that since doctors are not regulated by the 
                                                 
 241. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012). 
 242. See id. 
 243. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Cf. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 165-66. 
 244. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 165-66. 
 245. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66; Caronia, 703 F.3d at 165-66. 
 246. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166. 
 247. See id. 
 248. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 249. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166-67. 
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FDA and may prescribe drugs for off-label uses,250 the FDA’s 
prohibition on off-label marketing by pharmaceutical companies 
does not reduce patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs 
because it cannot prevent patients from taking drugs that physicians 
prescribe for off-label uses.251 The court also cited its own finding 
that off-label promotion is not inherently false or misleading, and in 
particular that Caronia’s speech was not false or misleading, to 
support the further conclusion that the FDA’s prohibition against off-
label marketing actually harmed patients who would benefit from 
investigational, off-label drugs if their doctors could receive truthful, 
non-misleading information about the drugs from sales 
representatives.252 The court reasoned that since prescribing and 
using drugs off-label is lawful, the FDA’s decision to restrict the 
flow of information about off-label uses by prohibiting off-label 
marketing did not advance the government’s interest in protecting 
consumers.253 
The Caronia court’s opinion and conclusions are poorly 
reasoned as to this factor because its premises are flawed. As a 
preliminary matter, it is important to note that even though the FDA 
does not regulate physicians, and even though physicians may 
prescribe drugs for off-label uses, physicians have a duty to use their 
best medical judgment when treating patients and to conform 
treatment at least to the applicable medical standard of care.254 A 
                                                 
 250. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84. 
 251. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166. 
 252. Id. at 166-67. 
 253. Id. at 167 (“The government’s construction of the FDCA essentially 
legalizes the outcome—off-label use—but prohibits the free flow of information that 
would inform that outcome. If the government’s objective is to shepherd physicians 
to prescribe drugs only on-label, criminalizing manufacturer promotion of off-label 
use while permitting others to promote such use to physicians is an indirect and 
questionably effective means to achieve that goal. Thus, the government’s 
construction of the FDCA’s misbranding provisions does not directly advance its 
interest in reducing patient exposure to off-label drugs or in preserving the efficacy 
of the FDA drug approval process because the off-label use of such drugs continues 
to be generally lawful.”). 
 254. See Dresser & Frader, supra note 27, at 476 (“Off-label prescribing is 
an integral part of contemporary medicine. Many patients benefit when they receive 
drugs or devices under circumstances not specified on the label approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). An off-label use may provide the best 
available intervention for a patient, as well as the standard of care for a particular 
health problem.”); Good Reprint Practices, supra note 84 (“[O]ff-label uses or 
treatment regimens may be important and may even constitute a medically 
recognized standard of care. Accordingly, the public health may be advanced by 
healthcare professionals’ receipt of medical journal articles and medical or scientific 
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physician may be liable for malpractice if his care for a patient does 
not meet the applicable medical standard of care whether he 
prescribed an off-label drug or not.255 While the FDA does not 
regulate off-label prescribing, the same standards of care that 
regulate other medical practices apply to off-label prescribing and 
negative consequences exist for physicians who negligently harm 
patients with off-label drugs.256 The Caronia court should not have 
intimated that physicians prescribe drugs off-label without any legal 
restrictions and without giving any thought to possible harmful 
effects to patients.257 Physicians must be fully informed about how 
and why off-label drugs are prescribed in their medical fields258 and 
thus the Caronia court should not have attributed any detriment to 
patients harmed by physicians’ off-label prescribing as a failure of 
the FDA’s regulatory system.259 The point the court failed to grasp is 
that there is risk inherent in off-label prescribing and that without 
accurate, reliable information about off-label uses, patients might be 
harmed by an off-label prescription.260 
With an inaccurate view of off-label prescribing in mind, the 
Caronia court asserted that off-label promotion is not inherently 
false or misleading, which, although true, is not the correct inquiry 
                                                                                                       
reference publications on unapproved new uses of approved or cleared medical 
products that are truthful and not misleading.”). 
 255. See Dresser & Frader, supra note 27, at 476 (“Of course, like other parts 
of medical practice, off-label prescribing can lead to malpractice liability if it fails to 
conform to accepted standards of care.”). 
 256. See id. 
 257. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 167 (“[T]he off-label use of such drugs continues 
to be generally lawful.”). 
 258. “Off-Label” and Investigational Use, supra note 82 (“Good medical 
practice and the best interests of the patient require that physicians use legally 
available drugs, biologics and devices according to their best knowledge and 
judgment. If physicians use a product for an indication not in the approved labeling, 
they have the responsibility to be well informed about the product, to base its use on 
firm scientific rationale and on sound medical evidence, and to maintain records of 
the product’s use and effects.”).
 259. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 167. 
 260. According to Dresser and Frader, 
When scientific and medical evidence justify off-label uses, physicians 
promote patients’ interests by prescribing products off label. Off-label 
prescribing can also harm patients, however. The potential for harm is 
greatest when an off-label use lacks a solid evidentiary basis. A 2006 
study examining prescribing practices for 169 commonly prescribed drugs 
found high rates of off-label use with little or no scientific support. 
Dresser & Frader, supra note 27, at 476. 
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under Central Hudson.261 Rather, the court should have concluded 
that off-label promotion by pharmaceutical sales representatives is 
more likely to mislead than to inform because insufficient 
information exists regarding the safety and effectiveness of off-label 
uses before those uses have been proven in clinical trials.262 From 
that conclusion, used as a new premise, the court would then have 
correctly determined that off-label promotion that is more likely to 
mislead than to inform is also more likely to harm patients than 
benefit them, especially when the patients’ physicians relied on 
incomplete promotional material when prescribing the drugs.263 The 
Caronia court should have concluded that the FDA’s ban on off-
label promotion directly advances the government’s substantial 
interest in ensuring the safety and effectiveness of drugs because it 
minimizes the risks to patients involved in off-label prescribing.264 
4. The Caronia Court’s Incorrect Application of the Fourth 
Central Hudson Factor  
The Caronia court moved on to the fourth prong of the Central 
Hudson analysis,265 which examines whether the government’s 
regulation is only as extensive as necessary to achieve the asserted 
government interest.266 The court concluded that the FDA’s ban was 
more extensive than necessary to further the government’s interests 
in protecting public health and ensuring the safety and efficacy of 
                                                 
 261. See supra Subsection IV.A.1. 
 262. See supra Subsection IV.A.1. 
 263. See Waxman, supra note 36, at 299 (“The FDCA’s restrictions on 
misleading and unsubstantiated promotional claims are central to its goal of 
preventing injury from dangerous and deceptive products. . . . As shown in a wealth 
of congressional documents, the history of the FDCA demonstrates beyond question 
that without premarket safety and effectiveness requirements, deceptive, 
unsubstantiated claims about health-related products proliferate, at a tremendous 
cost in human lives.”); Dresser & Frader, supra note 27, at 476 (“When substantial 
uncertainty exists about off-label applications, patients are at risk of receiving 
harmful or ineffective treatments.”). 
 264. Cf. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166 (“[P]rohibiting off-label promotion by a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer while simultaneously allowing off-label use 
‘paternalistically’ interferes with the ability of physicians and patients to receive 
potentially relevant treatment information; such barriers to information about off-
label use could inhibit, to the public’s detriment, informed and intelligent treatment 
decisions.”). 
 265. See id. at 167. 
 266. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
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drugs because feasible, less stringent alternatives to the FDA’s 
criminal ban on off-label promotion existed to achieve the same 
objectives.267 However, though the Central Hudson Court used the 
phrase “not more extensive than is necessary” to define the 
parameters of the fourth prong,268 the Supreme Court later refined its 
inquiry in a way that gives more deference to the regulatory choices 
made by the government with respect to restrictions on commercial 
speech.269 The Court explained that the phrase “not more extensive 
                                                 
 267. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 167-68 (“[T]he government’s construction of 
the FDCA to impose a complete and criminal ban on off-label promotion by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers is more extensive than necessary to achieve the 
government’s substantial interests. Numerous, less speech-restrictive alternatives are 
available, as are non-criminal penalties.”). 
 268. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (“[W]e must determine whether the 
regulation . . . is not more extensive than is necessary to serve [the government’s] 
interest.”). 
 269. In Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, Justice 
Scalia explained the rationale for not requiring the government to use the least 
restrictive means under the Central Hudson analysis: 
Our cases have repeatedly stated that government restrictions upon 
commercial speech may be no more broad or no more expansive than 
“necessary” to serve its substantial interests. If the word “necessary” is 
interpreted strictly, these statements would translate into the “least-
restrictive-means” test. . . . There are undoubtedly formulations in some of 
our cases that support this view—for example, the statement in Central
Hudson itself that “if the governmental interest could be served as well by 
a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions 
cannot survive.” We have indeed assumed in dicta the validity of the 
“least-restrictive-means” approach. However . . . the word “necessary” is 
sometimes used more loosely. And other formulations in our commercial 
speech cases support a more flexible meaning for the Central Hudson test. 
. . . Whatever the conflicting tenor of our prior dicta may be, we now 
focus upon this specific issue for the first time, and conclude that the 
reason of the matter requires something short of a least-restrictive-means 
standard. 
Our jurisprudence has emphasized that “commercial speech 
[enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its 
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,” and is 
subject to “modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm 
of noncommercial expression.” The ample scope of regulatory authority 
suggested by such statements would be illusory if it were subject to a 
least-restrictive-means requirement, which imposes a heavy burden on the 
State.  
We have refrained from imposing a least-restrictive-means 
requirement—even where core political speech is at issue—in assessing 
the validity of so-called time, place, and manner restrictions. We uphold 
such restrictions so long as they are “narrowly tailored” to serve a 
significant governmental interest, a standard that we have not interpreted 
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than is necessary” did not mean that the regulation must use the least 
restrictive means available or eliminate alternatives.270 Rather, the 
government’s regulation must employ means that are reasonable, 
proportionate, and narrowly tailored to achieve the end.271 “Within 
those bounds,” stated the Court, “we leave it to governmental 
decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be 
employed.”272 The government has some leeway to choose the most 
effective regulation from among various alternatives and need not 
choose the least restrictive alternative.273 
If the Caronia court had used this revised standard under the 
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, then the fact that there were 
feasible, less-restrictive alternatives to the FDA’s off-label 
promotion ban would not have caused it to conclude that the 
regulation failed under the fourth factor.274 Under Central Hudson, as 
later clarified by the Supreme Court, the government is permitted to 
restrict commercial speech to achieve a substantial government 
interest by any reasonable means that are narrowly tailored to the 
goal.275 The Caronia court should have granted the FDA the 
deference it is allowed under Central Hudson and Fox.276  
                                                                                                       
to require elimination of all less restrictive alternatives . . . . In requiring 
that to be “narrowly tailored” to serve an important or substantial state 
interest, we have not insisted that there be no conceivable alternative, but 
only that the regulation not “burden substantially more speech than is 
necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.” And we have 
been loath to second-guess the Government’s judgment to that effect. 
While these two lines of authority do not of course govern here, we think 
it would be incompatible with the asserted “subordinate position [of 
commercial speech] in the scale of First Amendment values” to apply a 
more rigid standard in the present context. 
492 U.S. 469, 476-78 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 270. See id.; Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 271. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (“In sum . . . we have not gone so far as to impose 
upon [regulators] the burden of demonstrating that . . . the manner of restriction is 
absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end. What our decisions 
require is a ‘“fit” between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish 
those ends,’—a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not 
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the 
interest served,’; that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but, as we 
have put it in the other contexts discussed above, a means narrowly tailored to 
achieve the desired objective.”).  
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 275. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 476-80. 
 276. Id. 
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From a deferential standpoint, the FDA’s ban on off-label 
promotion by pharmaceutical companies is not unreasonable. The 
FDA’s substantial government interests are to promote and protect 
public health by ensuring that drugs are safe and effective for their 
intended uses277 and to preserve the integrity of the FDA’s new drug 
approval process through which the FDA furthers its goals for public 
health.278 The FDCA also requires the FDA to ensure that the 
marketing efforts of drug manufacturers do not produce promotional 
materials that are false or misleading.279 Although off-label 
promotional speech is not inherently false or misleading, the truthful 
or non-misleading nature of the speech cannot be demonstrated until 
rigorous clinical testing has conclusively proven the safety and 
effectiveness of an off-label use.280 In the past, false and misleading 
promotional speech from pharmaceutical companies caused harm to 
people who relied on representations that the drugs would perform as 
stated for the drugs’ advertised uses.281 The FDA thus promulgated 
the prohibition on off-label promotion as one rational way to prevent 
false or misleading promotional speech from causing harm to 
patients.282 
5. The FDA’s Regulation Passes the Test for Restrictions on 
Commercial Speech  
Under Central Hudson, the FDA’s prohibition against off-label 
marketing passes the test as a restriction on commercial speech that 
                                                 
 277. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1)-(2) (2012); see also Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166 
(“[T]he government’s asserted interests in drug safety and public health are 
substantial. Specifically, the government asserts an interest in preserving the 
effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s drug approval process, and an interest in 
reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.”). 
 278. See Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 15, at 315-16 (“While [FDA-
approved drugs] have been vetted and approved by the FDA for their designated 
purpose, at no point has the FDA reviewed the supporting scientific data to 
determine efficacy for the off-label purpose. . . . [W]idespread off-label use of 
prescription drugs and devices conceivably undermines the FDA’s authority and 
deters manufacturers from seeking on-label FDA approval for even widespread 
alternative uses.”). 
 279. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1)-(2) (2012). 
 280. Id. § 355(b)(1)(A) (requiring all new drug applications to include “full 
reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug is 
safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use” before approval). 
 281. See supra Part I-Section I.A. 
 282. See supra Section I.B. 
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does not violate the First Amendment.283 Contrary to the conclusion 
of the Caronia court, off-label promotion is more likely to mislead 
than to inform.284 The regulation also directly advances the 
substantial government interest in ensuring the safety and efficacy of 
drugs.285 Additionally, the regulation is narrowly tailored and 
reasonably related to achieving the government’s goals.286 Although 
the FDA’s method of ensuring public safety and welfare by 
prohibiting off-label promotion is constitutional, that method is also 
practically problematic because it hinders information about off-label 
uses from circulating freely.287 
B. Practical Problems, Policy Arguments, and a Proposed Solution 
Despite the prohibition’s decided constitutionality, the ban 
problematically covers truthful, non-misleading promotional speech 
in addition to the false and misleading promotional speech that it 
rightly quashes.288 This practical problem prevents some valuable 
information about off-label indications from passing from the 
pharmaceutical companies that possess it to the physicians who 
would put it to good use.289 Many opponents of the FDA’s ban on 
                                                 
 283. See supra Subsections IV.A.1-4. 
 284. See supra Subsection IV.A.1. 
 285. See supra Subsection IV.A.3. 
 286. See supra Subsection IV.A.4.
 287. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 
196, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Such doctors . . . ‘need truthful and non-misleading 
information about these drugs to make informed decisions about what is best for 
their patients,’ but the ‘[FDA]’s current regime for regulating the flow of “off-label” 
information to doctors about prescription drugs . . . severely restricts medical 
professionals’ access to information from the source most knowledgeable about the 
drugs: the drug manufacturers . . . .’” (quoting Pl.’s Compl., supra note 97, ¶ 3)). 
 288. See Osborn, supra note 25, at 305-06 (“[I]nvariably there will be 
occasions in which the [pharmaceutical] company is in possession of truthful, non-
misleading scientific and medical information [about off-label uses] that will not be 
included in the current, approved labeling.”); Greenwood, supra note 19, at 297-98 
(“[T]here is no way to gain the benefits of false advertising law without sweeping in 
some truthful speech. . . . Given medicine’s high stakes, it is neither surprising nor 
unconstitutional that the prophylactic rule that governs drug claims suppresses some 
truthful speech.”). 
 289. See Osborn, supra note 25, at 306 (explaining that the ban on off-label 
promotion “limits the full dissemination to prescribing physicians of useful medical 
information”); “Off-Label” and Investigational Use, supra note 82 (“Good medical 
practice and the best interests of the patient require that physicians use legally 
available drugs . . . according to their best knowledge and judgment. If physicians 
use a product for an indication not in the approved labeling, they have the 
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off-label promotion argue that, from a public policy perspective, the 
ban causes serious harm to the pharmaceutical industry and to 
patients who would benefit from more widespread information 
regarding investigational, off-label drugs.290  
As enacted in 1938 and amended in 1962, the purpose of the 
FDCA was to reduce the risk of harm to patients posed by unsafe and 
ineffective drugs.291 The FDCA addressed the problem through a 
twofold solution: (1) the statute required informative labeling to 
ensure that customers received accurate information about the drugs 
they purchased or used292 and (2) the statute made it a crime to 
misbrand a drug, either by mislabeling or otherwise misrepresenting 
facts about the drug.293 Both of these statutory innovations concerned 
the amount and quality of information disseminated about drugs.294 
The provisions on labeling seek to provide the public with more 
                                                                                                       
responsibility to be well informed about the product, to base its use on firm 
scientific rationale and on sound medical evidence, and to maintain records of the 
product’s use and effects.”). 
 290. See Osborn, supra note 25, at 301, 303 (“[T]he single greatest threat to 
the pharmaceutical industry may be the policy environment within the United States, 
which is restricting the ability of companies to speak truthfully with physicians 
about their products.”); Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 15, at 316 (“[W]hile it is 
true that the ban on off-label promotion by manufacturers prevents false or 
misleading advertising, because the ban is all-inclusive it simultaneously prevents 
promotion of valuable off-label uses of which doctors may well be unaware. . . . As 
a result, in many instances doctors are likely to be deprived of valuable information 
about important off-label uses that are totally lawful and extremely beneficial to 
some very sick people.”). 
 291. See supra Part I-Section I.A. 
 292. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a)-(c), (e)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2012) (“A drug or device shall 
be deemed to be misbranded—(a) [i]f its labeling is false or misleading in any 
particular . . . (b) [i]f in package form unless it bears a label containing (1) the name 
and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor; and (2) an accurate 
statement of the quantity of the contents in terms of weight, measure, or numerical 
count . . . (c) [i]f any word, statement, or other information required by or under 
authority of this chapter to appear on the label or labeling is not prominently placed 
thereon with such conspicuousness . . . and in such terms as to render it likely to be 
read and understood by the ordinary individual under customary conditions of 
purchase and use . . . (e)(1)(A) [i]f it is a drug, unless its label bears, to the exclusion 
of any other nonproprietary name . . . (i) the established name . . . of the drug, if 
there is such a name; (ii) the established name and quantity or, if determined to be 
appropriate by the Secretary, the proportion of each active ingredient . . . and 
(iii) the established name of each inactive ingredient listed in alphabetical order on 
the outside container of the retail package and, if determined to be appropriate by 
the Secretary, on the immediate container . . . .”). 
 293. Id. § 331. 
 294. Id. §§ 331, 352(a)-(c), (e)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). 
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accurate information about the drugs.295 The provisions prohibiting 
misbranding seek to protect the public by reducing the amount of 
false and misleading information in circulation.296 The statute as a 
whole seeks to regulate the information available by promoting or 
requiring factual, accurate information, while prohibiting false or 
inaccurate information.297 While no difficulty exists in applying these 
provisions when those in the pharmaceutical and medical industries 
know what information is false and what information is true, a 
problem arises when little or nothing is known about the safety and 
efficacy of a drug’s uses.298 
In the context of off-label drug use, the inherent problem is the 
lack of tested and proven information about the safety and effects of 
the drugs.299 For an off-label use, both the degree of risk of harm 
from the drug and the accuracy of statements made about the drug 
are unknown.300 Yet both sides of the policy argument surrounding 
off-label promotion agree that doctors need reliable information to 
                                                 
 295. Id. § 352(a)-(c), (e)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). 
 296. Id. § 331. 
 297. Id. §§ 331, 352(a)-(c), (e)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). 
 298. See Dresser & Frader, supra note 27, at 476 (“When substantial 
uncertainty exists about off-label applications, patients are at risk of receiving 
harmful or ineffective treatments. . . . In a perfect world, all uses of drugs and 
devices would be supported by solid research. The existing regulatory system fails 
to impose this high standard, however, and the private sector often lacks incentives 
to conduct rigorous evaluations of off-label uses.”). 
 299. Dresser and Frader explain the valuable information generated through 
clinical trials and the FDA’s new drug approval process: 
FDA officials evaluate safety and effectiveness [for each new drug] and 
determine whether the probability and magnitude of potential benefits are 
sufficient to justify a product’s risks. . . . [T]he FDA review process . . . 
generally produces high-quality information that enhances clinical 
practice. In most cases, the FDA review process gives physicians a 
reasonable evidentiary basis for on-label prescribing. But the initial FDA 
review fails to answer whether a product should be used off label. A 
product may be safe and effective for one indication, but could present a 
different risk-benefit ratio for another indication. . . . When FDA officials 
approve a product, they approve a specific label for that product, too. The 
label includes information about the approved indications for product use, 
as well as the approved dosage, method of administration, and patient 
population.  
Dresser & Frader, supra note 27, at 477 (internal footnotes omitted). Because the 
FDA does not review all possible uses of a drug for safety and efficacy, and because 
the manufacturers do not run clinical trials for all possible uses, often no reliable 
information about those uses is available to physicians. Id. 
 300. Id. 
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make proper care recommendations to their patients.301 As a practical 
solution to this policy problem, the FDA should balance the risks 
caused by scientific uncertainty by allowing manufacturers to 
circulate some information about off-label uses to physicians, but it 
should restrict the authorized information to the factual results and 
logical inferences obtained from clinical trials, even if the clinical 
trials are not conclusive as to the safety and effectiveness of the off-
label use.302 If physicians were able to see unbiased results of clinical 
trials, even if the results were inconclusive, they would at least have 
some reliable scientific information about the possible uses, doses, 
side effects, and initial results than if they did not have that access.303 
The FDA should allow pharmaceutical companies to step into this 
information-dissemination role once they have completed clinical 
trials and submitted a supplemental new drug application to the FDA 
for a particular off-label use in order to preserve the integrity of the 
drug approval process.304 As the Caronia court reasonably stated, off-
label promotional speech is not inherently false or misleading,305 and 
accordingly the FDA should propose a rulemaking by which it would 
allow pharmaceutical companies to draft factual, truthful, unbiased, 
and non-misleading statements about the results of the companies’ 
most recent clinical trials to disseminate to physicians who desire 
reliable information about an off-label use.306  
                                                 
 301. Compare Osborn, supra note 25, at 306, and Klasmeier & Redish, 
supra note 15, at 316 (both citing physicians’ need for information about off-label 
drugs as one reason to repeal the FDA’s prohibition on off-label marketing), with 21 
U.S.C. §§ 331, 352(a)-(c), (e)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (requiring more, accurate information on 
drug labels for the purpose of protecting patients). 
 302. See supra note 299. 
 303. Cf. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 
196, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Such doctors . . . ‘need truthful and non-misleading 
information about these drugs to make informed decisions about what is best for 
their patients,’ but the ‘[FDA]’s current regime for regulating the flow of “off-label” 
information to doctors about prescription drugs . . . severely restricts medical 
professionals’ access to information from the source most knowledgeable about the 
drugs: the drug manufacturers . . . .’” (quoting Pl.’s Compl., supra note 97, ¶ 3)). 
 304. See also Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 15, at 316 (“[W]idespread off-
label use of prescription drugs and devices conceivably undermines the FDA’s 
authority and deters manufacturers from seeking on-label FDA approval for even 
widespread alternative uses.”). As reported in Amarin Pharma, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 
at 214-15, Amarin requested that the FDA allow it to circulate promotional 
statements, preapproved by the FDA, based on its latest clinical trials of an off-label 
use of one of its drugs.
 305. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 165. 
 306. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 101-03. 
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In Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 
the pharmaceutical manufacturer Amarin wanted to disclose to 
physicians the results of clinical trials of its drug Vascepa, which had 
been proven to lower high triglyceride levels, but which had unclear 
implications for prevention of cardiovascular disease.307 Amarin 
wanted to use plain, straightforward statements of fact about the 
results of the testing, including the extent to which the off-label use 
had been proven effective and the extent to which the tests had been 
inconclusive.308 The trial court ultimately agreed that the information 
Amarin wanted to use as promotional materials was truthful and non-
misleading, and following the Caronia court, found that to decide 
otherwise would pose a First Amendment issue.309 While, contrary to 
the Caronia and Amarin courts’ view, the First Amendment does not 
conflict with the FDA’s off-label marketing prohibition,310 the FDA 
should appreciate the practical value and benefit that would come 
from allowing pharmaceutical manufacturers to use factual, non-
misleading information about the results of clinical trials as 
promotional materials for off-label uses.311 
The FDA might resist such a policy on two grounds: 
(1) allowing pharmaceutical manufacturers to market drugs off-label 
will undermine the integrity of the drug approval process because the 
manufacturers would not have an incentive to file a supplemental 
new drug application for the off-label use312 and (2) it is not possible 
to have any accurate information before clinical trials have 
conclusively shown that an off-label use either is or is not safe and 
effective.313 First, this solution will not undermine the drug approval 
process because pharmaceutical manufacturers would be required to 
submit a supplemental new drug application before assuming the 
information-dissemination role.314 Second, this solution does not 
                                                 
 307. Amarin Pharma, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d at 212-15. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. at 237. 
 310. See supra Section IV.A. 
 311. Cf. Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 15, at 316 (“[W]hile it is true that 
the ban on off-label promotion by manufacturers prevents false or misleading 
advertising, because the ban is all-inclusive it simultaneously prevents promotion of 
valuable off-label uses of which doctors may well be unaware. . . . As a result, in 
many instances doctors are likely to be deprived of valuable information about 
important off-label uses that are totally lawful and extremely beneficial to some very 
sick people.”). 
 312. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
 313. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 28, at 2-3. 
 314. See supra text accompanying note 304. 
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claim to eliminate all risk from off-label marketing and prescribing, 
but balances the risk inherent in off-label use with the public’s need 
for information.315 Patients benefit from off-label uses when 
physicians, in their best medical judgment, properly prescribe those 
uses, and it is the FDA’s responsibility to facilitate dissemination of 
the most reliable and up-to-date information available.316 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers also might object that the FDA 
should allow them to market off-label without any restrictions or 
requirement that they file supplemental new drug applications before 
doing so, as the Caronia and Amarin courts were inclined to allow.317 
However, the health and safety of patient–consumers remains the 
goal of the FDCA, and the means chosen by the FDA to regulate the 
pharmaceutical industry must reflect that goal.318 Also, under Central 
Hudson, any regulation of commercial speech must be narrowly 
tailored to achieve the government’s substantial interest.319 The FDA 
must uphold the regulatory process, and so the FDA must incentivize 
manufacturers to file new drug approvals for off-label uses.320 
In summary, although the Caronia court found the FDA’s ban 
on off-label promotion to be an unconstitutional violation of the First 
Amendment, the court misapplied the Central Hudson test for 
restrictions on commercial speech and should have upheld the 
prohibition.321 While the ban is constitutional, the FDA’s policy is 
practically problematic because it restricts the flow of information 
about off-label uses and prevents physicians from receiving 
scientifically verified information when the FDA has not yet 
approved an off-label use.322 Therefore, the FDA should adopt a 
policy allowing pharmaceutical manufacturers to present factual 
                                                 
 315. See supra text accompanying notes 299-302. 
 316. See Dresser & Frader, supra note 27, at 476. 
 317. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2012); Amarin 
Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
 318. See Waxman, supra note 36, at 299 (“The FDCA’s restrictions on 
misleading and unsubstantiated promotional claims are central to its goal of 
preventing injury from dangerous and deceptive products. . . . As shown in a wealth 
of congressional documents, the history of the FDCA demonstrates beyond question 
that without premarket safety and effectiveness requirements, deceptive, 
unsubstantiated claims about health-related products proliferate, at a tremendous 
cost in human lives.”). 
 319. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). 
 320. See Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 15, at 316. 
 321. See supra Section IV.A. 
 322. See supra Section IV.B. 
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statements about the results of clinical trials for an off-label use to 
physicians, after the manufacturer files a supplemental new drug 
application for that use, even if the studies are inconclusive.323 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Second Circuit found that the FDA’s regulatory 
ban on off-label pharmaceutical marketing violates the First 
Amendment,324 the marketing policy is constitutional and the First 
Amendment does not stand in the way.325 In United States v. 
Caronia, the Second Circuit misapplied the Central Hudson test for 
whether a government regulation constitutionally restricts 
commercial speech, an error that should be recognized on review by 
the Supreme Court in an appropriate case.326 Despite the 
constitutionality of the FDA’s chosen regulation, there is a need for 
dissemination of truthful, non-misleading information regarding off-
label uses.327 The FDA should allow pharmaceutical companies and 
their representatives to fill that need by providing factual, 
informative, and unbiased summaries of the most up-to-date medical 
research for unapproved uses of drugs to prescribing physicians.328 
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